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Liberation Movement/Army and the government of Sudan during the second Sudanese 
civil war. This research analyzed the impact of the nature of the parties, mediator, 
mediator strategy, and mediation timing as contributing factors toward conflict resolution 
during the Abuja peace process and Inter-Governmental Authority for Development 
peace initiatives on mediation outcomes.  
The factors most influential to mediation outcomes were based primarily on 
belligerents’ perceptions of the usefulness of mediation. Third-party intervention created 
a forum for the disputants to negotiate, but mediator attributes and strategy had a 
negligible effect on mediation outcomes. Mediation resulted in failure when parties had 
not yet encountered conditions that made mediation a viable option to achieve their goals; 
however, mediation conducted at the right time, when parties were ready to negotiate, 
resulted in successful outcomes. No single factor determined mediation outcomes, but 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, parties involved in violent conflict have used mediation to 
settle disputes.1 From 1860 to 1960, international actors attempted to mediate an end to 
international hostilities more than 300 times.2 Forty-six percent of all international crises 
since the end of the Cold War used mediation, representing a 30 percent increase of 
incidents from 1918–1989.3 From 1990 to 2005, mediators settled 69 percent of all 
violent ethnic crises in Africa.4  
International actors used mediation in 382 cases worldwide from 1945–1995; 52.4 
percent of those ended unsuccessfully, and only 5.2 percent saw a full settlement to the 
conflict.5 Although actors’ adoption of mediation demonstrated their beliefs in 
mediation’s ability to end conflict, the low success rate suggests that intentions do not 
dictate outcomes. Mediators have had success rates as low as 5 percent for full resolution 
and 43 percent for partial settlement of conflicts. Given the low financial investment that  
 
 
                                                 
1 Peter J. Carnevale and Dean G. Pruitt, “Negotiation and Mediation,” Annual Review of Psychology 
43 (1992): 532, http://division.aomonline.org/cm/Award-Winning-Papers/1998-MIA-Carnevale.pdf. 
Carnevale and Pruitt cite mediation that occurred in Mesopotamia; I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, 
“International Mediation,” in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds. 
Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2007), 437. They state mediation is as old as history and “has been part of diplomacy since the 
establishment of the state system in 1648.”  
2 The conditions of what constitutes “conflict” (interstate versus civil war, duration and conflict 
deaths) and “mediation” differ in each analysis. Edward P. Levine, “Mediation in International Politics: A 
Universe and Some Observations,” Peace Research Society (International) Papers 18 (1972), 33–43, 
quoted in I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, “Mediation: The Role of Third-Party Diplomacy and 
Informal Peacemaking,” in Resolving Third-World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era, eds. Sheryl Brown 
and Kimber M. Schraub (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1992), 241; Kyle C. Beardsley 
et al., “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no.1 (2006): 59.  
3 Beardsley et al., “Mediation Style,” 59.  
4 Pelin Eralp, David Quinn, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “Delivering Peace: Options for Mediators in 
African Intrastate Crises,” in Peace and Conflict 2012, eds. J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Ted 
Robert Gurr (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 91. 
5. Jacob Berkovitch, “Mediation in the Most Resistant Cases,” in Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases 
of Intractable Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 107. In the analysis the outcomes are, mediation offered only, 
unsuccessful, cease-fire, partial agreement and full settlement.  
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mediation requires, however, should mediators consider attempting mediation even when 
conditions forecast failure? What explains mediation outcomes? Why do mediation 
efforts fail at one time and succeed later? 
A. PURPOSE 
Successful mediation can reduce or eliminate the enormous financial, 
institutional, social, and human costs of violent conflict. If mediators can improve their 
understanding of what causes variation in mediation outcomes, then they should be able 
to enhance conflict resolution success rates. Mediators might reduce the impact of 
conflict by refining mediation skills or simply applying mediation resources more 
discriminately to situations where and when they might prove most effective. 
Understanding why and how events, actors, and situations influence mediation can help 
practitioners and scholars determine the profitability of future mediation.  
No single factor adequately explains mediation outcomes. Rather, mediation 
outcomes result from factors relating to both context and process. This thesis evaluates 
process and context factors to determine which are more influential to mediation 
outcomes. It seeks to explain why mediation might fail in one instance but succeed in 
another. Multiple mediation attempts during the second Sudan civil war between the 
government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) serves as the conflict for analysis for context and process factor evaluation on 
mediation outcomes. This thesis determined that the absence of a “ripe moment” for 
mediation results in mediation failures.6 Appropriate timing occurs when belligerents 
perceived mediation as a viable option to achieve conflict objectives. Furthermore, the 
nature of the party significantly affected mediation outcomes of Sudan peace initiatives 
and mediator attributes and mediator strategy played a minor role in influencing 
mediation outcomes.  
                                                 
6 I. William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives,” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1, no 1 
(2001): 10, accessed on 15 August 2013, 
http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_I/issue_1/zartman.pdf  
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From 1983–2005, the North-South Sudanese civil war raged between the GoS and 
the SPLM/A. During this period, the warring parties attempted mediation several times: 
The Abuja Peace Conference (1992–1993) and two iterations of The Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Initiative.7 IGAD I took place from January 
1994–October 2001, and IGAD II from 2002–2005. IGAD II had two phases: May 2002–
July 2002 and August 2002–January 2005. Mediation efforts were limited in success and 
prone to failure for almost a decade of third-party involvement. This thesis examined the 
relevancy of certain factors to mediation’s success or failure in resolving the North-South 
Sudanese conflict.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In recent years, more countries have turned to mediation to resolve violent 
conflicts. As a result, researchers expanded their inquiry into mediation’s theoretical 
application and practice, and examined what determined mediation outcomes. Mediation 
is “a process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an 
offer or help from, an individual, group, or organization to change their behavior, settle 
their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the 
authority of the law”8 Most researchers agree that a complex interplay between conflict 
conditions, participant (both mediator and disputant) actions and reactions, and 
expectations determine mediation outcomes. Little analysis exists, however, on how these 
factors specifically influenced mediation outcomes. Most studies simply present a list of 
factors without identifying why those factors influenced mediation outcomes.  
The literature defines the factors that influence mediation outcomes into context 
variables and mediation process variables. The literature on context factors examines the 
nature of the dispute, parties, mediator, and whether the conflict was “ripe” for 
                                                 
7 IGAD was originally named the Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and Development but the 
group name changed to the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development in 1996.  
8 Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues 
and Empirical Evidence,” in Resolving International Conflicts: Theory and Practice of Mediation, ed. 
Jacob Bercovitch (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 13. 
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mediation.9 The literature on process analyzes mediation strategy and role. It is important 
to note, however, that process and context factors are not mutually exclusive variables. 
The purpose of the process is to affect the context of the mediation and the context 
impacts the strategy used and the role of the mediator. 
1. Context Factors 
Scholarship on mediation views context as a critical element in determining 
mediation outcomes. The nature of the conflict, parties involved, mediator, and whether a 
conflict is ripe for mediation each affect mediation outcomes in varying degrees. Scholars 
prioritize the nature of the conflict as the principal driver; the nature of the parties and 
mediator and mediation strategy are less influential on mediation outcome. Mediation 
ripeness is also a critical factor, contingent on conflict issues, parties, mediator and 
mediator strategy.  
Researchers say that the nature of the dispute is the most important determinant of 
mediation outcomes.10 Conflict complexity negatively affects mediation outcomes, and 
mediators have more difficulty resolving them and are thus less likely to be successful 
when conflicts are ideologically driven.11 Furthermore, the divisibility and intractability 
of the issues driving conflict significantly affect the likelihood that mediation efforts will 
succeed.12 Conflicts of “subjective and emotional issues often provoke fear, resentment 
                                                 
9 I. William Zartman, “Ripeness,” Beyond Intractability, eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess 
(Boulder, CO: Conflict Information Consortium) accessed 15 August 2013, 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness.  
10 Bercovitch and Houston, “The Study of International Mediation,” 21. Bercovitch and Houston 
conduct an extensive comparison of the factors that influence mediation outcomes.  
11 Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley, “The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of 
International Mediation,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 no. 4 (Dec 1993): 687; Jacob Bercovitch, J. 
Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L. Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study 
of Successful Mediation in International Relations,” Journal of Peace Research, 28, no.1 (Feb. 1991): 12. 
The following success rates were noted in the authors’ analysis of issues in dispute: Territory-23%, 
Ideology-10%, Security-27%, Independence-11% and other-50%. 
12 Berkovitch, “Mediation in the Most Resistant Cases,” 119; Timothy D. Sisk, “Peacemaking in Civil 
Wars: Obstacles, Options, and Opportunities,” in Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on 
Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia, eds. Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 254. 
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and distrust that make negotiation and mediation difficult.”13 There is no consensus on 
what conflict conditions produce favorable mediation outcomes. Conflict duration and 
intensity (fatalities) could improve or worsen mediation success.14 Researchers agree that 
the reason for the dispute is the primary determinant of mediation outcomes. 
Many scholars in this field maintain that the nature of the parties involved impacts 
mediation outcomes. Mediators can more easily engage legitimate, cohesive parties with 
shared norms, cultural values, and sociopolitical similarities, which will lead to higher 
success rates.15 Timothy Sisk argues it is important to “look inside groups in conflict. … 
the relative balance of power between moderates and hard-liners—those who will fight to 
the bitter end—is the most important factor in explaining why some countries move to 
peace and others stay trapped in seemingly incessant war.”16 Intra-party dynamics affects 
mediation outcomes. If there are differences in party objectives, then it is less likely that 
the parties will make a concerted effort to negotiate and mediations are therefore likely to 
be unsuccessful. This is because group leaders are pulled between different factions to 
satisfy their varying interests. Furthermore, negotiation delegations may be given 
different goals by different leaders, unable to satisfy the demands of either.   
Aside from factors internal to each of the warring parties, the nature of the 
relationship between the parties in conflict is also important. David Quinn et al. and 
others report that mediations are most successful “under conditions of power 
                                                 
13 Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, “Why Do They Do It Like This: An Analysis of the Factors 
Influencing Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 2 
(2000): 177. 
 14 Bercovitch and Houston, “The Study of International Mediation,” 21. 
15 Bercovitch and Houston, “The Study of International Mediation,” 21; Daniel Druckman, and 
Katherine Zechmeister, “Conflict of Interest and Value Dissensus,” Human Relations 23 (1970): 431–438; 
Glenn, E., et al., “A Cognitive Interaction Model to Analyze Culture Conflict in International Relations,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 14: 35–48 as quoted in Gregory A. Raymond and Charles W. Kegley, “Third 
Party Mediation and International Norms: A Test of Two Models.” Conflict Management and Peace 
Science 9 (1985): 38. 
16 Sisk, “Peacemaking,” 257. 
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symmetry.”17 J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl similarly observe that power parity in 
civil conflicts “both increases the likelihood of full settlement and reduces the likelihood 
of failure overall ... and conflicts among equals are also more likely to achieve partial 
agreements and cease-fires than conflicts with an unequal distribution of power.”18 
Ronald J. Fisher notes that “some degree of power balance is necessary before third-party 
interventions can operate effectively.”19 Where power parity exists, both sides recognize 
that they are equally matched, making a violent defeat unlikely; mediation then becomes 
an acceptable means to end the conflict.20  
Findings in the literature have been inconsistent, however, about what effect the 
nature of the mediator has on the mediation outcomes. Saadia Touval and I William 
Zartman suggest that the nature of the mediator is important, considering the mediator’s 
ability to directly influence involved parties.21 The mediator’s arrival changes the 
                                                 
17 David Quinn et al., “Power Play: Mediation in Symmetric and Asymmetric International Crises,” in 
International Mediation: New Approaches and Findings, eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner 
(Washington, DC: Routledge, 2009), 208–209; Beardsley et al., “Mediation Style,” 77; P. Terrence 
Hopmann, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflict (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1996), 108 quoted in Quinn et al, “Power Play: Mediation,” 187; Hopmann stated, 
“Influence is symmetrical when [state] B can use counter-threats or counter-promises to cancel or to in 
some way substantially negate A’s attempt to influence B. Conversely, influence is asymmetrical when B 
has little or no such ability to exert influence in reply to A”; Robert Lyle Butterworth, Managing Interstate 
Disputes, 1945–1974 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976) quoted in Bercovitch and Houston, 
“The Study of International Mediation,” 22; Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in 
International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) quoted in Jacob Bercovitch, “Mediation 
in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice,” in Peacemaking in International 
Conflict: Methods and Techniques, eds I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute for Peace, 1997),145; Bercovitch and Houston, “The Study of International 
Mediation,” 21; Raymond and Kegley, “Third Party Mediation,” 47.  
 18 J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, International Mediation (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2012), 
132. 
19 Ronald J. Fisher, “Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of Conflict,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 16 (1972): 67–94 quoted in Ronald J. Fisher, “Methods of Third-party 
Intervention,” Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for 
Constructive Conflict Management, 2001), 19. 
20 Marieke Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution40, no. 2 (1996): 368; Fisher, “Third Party Consultation,” 92. Fisher noted that “if there 
is an extreme power imbalance, it is likely that the applicability of third party consultation is severely 
reduced. In the first place, the more powerful party may have little urge to enter discussions since it has 
what it wants and feels that it can keep it, and in the second place, the weaker party may feel it that will 
have no real influence in such discussions.”  
21 Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, “Introduction: Mediation in Theory,” in International 
Mediation in Theory and Practice, eds. Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1985), 10. 
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relationship from a two-party to a three-party dynamic and the third-party’s interests can 
be critical to the mediation outcomes.22 Thomas Kochan and Todd Jick caveat this, 
noting that the, “personal qualities and strategies of the mediator have the greatest impact 
in cases where the parties are somewhat less sophisticated or where they have not clearly 
defined their bargaining objectives.”23 Touval and Zartman view the overall impact of 
mediators as critical to outcomes, while Kochan and Jick consider mediator influence 
conditionally based on the status of the parties. In either condition, the mediator’s ability 
to influence is based on parties’ perception and power of the mediator.24 David A. 
Brookmire and Frank Sistrunk note that “a mediator perceived to be high in ability 
exerted more influence on negotiators to move toward the suggested solution ... and a 
mediator perceived as having high ability was also seen more favorably.”25 Jacob 
Bercovitch states that “what mediators do, can do, or are permitted to do in their efforts to 
resolve a conflict may depend, to some extent, on who they are and what resources and 
competencies they can bring to bear.”26  
Scholars argue that the identity of the mediator (perception/legitimacy) and the 
resources available (power/leverage) are characteristics that could influence mediator 
effectiveness or his or her ability to influence results.27 Legitimacy is “the belief that the 
mediator has the right to prescribe behavior, and derives from a norm that has been 
accepted by the disputants.”28 “Leverage or resources buttress the mediator’s ability to 
facilitate a successful outcome through the balancing of power discrepancies and 
                                                 
22 Frank R. Pfetsch, Negotiating Political Conflicts (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2007), 154.  
23 Thomas Kochan and Todd Jick, “The Public Sector Mediation Process: A Theory and Empirical 
Examination,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 22, no 2 (June 1978): 236. 
24 Dean G. Pruitt, “Mediator Behavior and Success in Mediation,” in Studies in International 
Mediation, ed. Jacob Bercovitch (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 51.  
25David A. Brookmire and Frank Sistrunk, “The Effects of Perceived Ability and Impartiality of 
Mediators and Time Pressure on Negotiation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24 (1980): 323. 
26 Bercovitch, “Mediation in International Conflict,” 127.  
27 Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends,” 15.  
28 Peter J. Carnevale, “Mediating from Strength,” in Studies in International Mediation, ed. Jacob 
Bercovitch (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 28. 
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enhancing cooperative behavior.”29 Amy L. Smith and David R. Smock note that 
mediation outcomes will more likely be negative when a mediator lacks commitment, 
resources, or credibility.30 Legitimacy and leverage enable the mediator to engage the 
parties and influence the mediation proceedings with options, solutions, and 
recommendations, or to push or pull parties toward an agreement.31  
Scholars view mediator knowledge of conflict issues through differing lenses. 
Some suggest that mediators with greater information capacity are more likely to produce 
a desired outcome than those with low capacity.32 Therein, mediators with an 
understanding of the complex issues of the conflict are more likely to successfully distill 
the dispute to its core points, dissect the conflict’s issues, and arrive with proposals for a 
successful compromise. John Paul Lederach suggests otherwise; he notes that naivety 
indulges the meditator to ask questions that may bring to light issues that are considered 
answered or assumed.33 The lack of detailed understanding influences outcome because 
through mediator discovery new possibilities are brought to light.34  
When examining the nature of the mediator and its impact on mediation 
outcomes, the scholars also consider the mediator’s purpose for intervening. Bercovitch 
                                                 
29 Bercovitch and Houston, “The Study of International Mediation,” 9; Kleiboer, “Understanding 
Success,” 371. Kleiboer noted that “ ‘Leverage’ is an elusive element of mediation … it is not explicitly 
defined. Overall, it seems to refer to a mediator’s ability to put pressure on one or both of the conflicting 
parties to accept a proposed settlement. This assumes a mediator has power and influence that can be 
brought to bear on the parties.”  
30 Amy L. Smith and David R. Smock, “Managing a Mediation Process,” The Peacemaker’s Toolkit 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), 26. 
31 Bercovitch and Houston, “The Study of International Mediation,” 22; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and 
Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends,” 15; J. Michael Greig and Patrick M. Regan. 
“When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars.” 
International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008): 768–769.  
32 Burcu Savon, “Mediator Types and the Effectiveness of Information Provision Strategies in the 
Resolution of International Conflict,” in International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings, 
eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner (London: Routledge, 2009), 109; Jacob Bercovitch and 
Patrick Regan, “Mediation and International Conflict Management: A Review and Analysis,” Multiple 
Paths to Knowledge in International Relations, eds. Zeev Maoz et al (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2004) quoted in Greig and Diehl, International Mediation, 121. 
33 John Paul Lederach, “Cultivating Peace: A Practitioner’s View of Deadly Conflict and 
Negotiation,” Contemporary Peacemaking, eds. John Darby and Roger MacGinty (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 36. 
34 Ibid., 36. 
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observes that “the material, political, or other resources mediators invest in the process 
provide the rationale for their own motives and interests.”35 Mediators may be states, 
individuals, organizations, or a combination of these; historical linkages between the 
mediator and the parties influence the purpose for mediator intervention, mediator 
acceptability, and party willingness to accept solutions.36 Therefore, what the third party 
seeks and whether it has the power to influence mediation become relevant factors for 
determining the mediation outcomes. “A mediator is not unlike another party in the 
conflict-management process whose behavior and performance—what it wants to do, 
chooses to do, or is permitted to do—are as conditioned by the context and circumstances 
as the behavior of the adversaries themselves.”37  
Within the literature, specialists disagree about the impact of a mediator’s 
neutrality on mediation outcomes.38 Isak Svensson finds that neutral mediators are more 
effective in ending conflicts in the short term, but that biased mediators are more likely to 
reach long-term, sustainable settlements.39 Touval and Zartman report that “mediators 
must be perceived as having an interest in achieving an outcome acceptable to both sides 
and as not being so partial as to preclude such an agreement.”40 In other words, mediators 
may be biased as long as that bias does not undermine their ability to reach an agreement. 
Peter J. Carnevale and Sharon Arad conclude that “apparent impartiality can enhance the 
attractiveness and influence of a mediator.”41 While mediators may not be neutral, per se, 
the appearance that they would deal evenhandedly with both sides makes them more 
                                                 
35 Jacob Bercovitch, ed., Resolving International Conflicts: Theory and Practice of Mediation 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996): 3.  
36 Greig and Regan, “When Do They Say Yes?” 761–763. 
37 Bercovitch, ed., Resolving International Conflicts, 4. 
38 Bercovitch, ed., Resolving International Conflicts, 26; Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and 
Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005): 169; Fisher, 
“Third Party Consultation,” 21; Carnevale and Pruitt, “Negotiation,” 568; Thomas Princen, Intermediaries 
in International Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University, 1992), 25. 
39 Isak Svensson, “Who Brings Which Peace? Neutral versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace 
Arrangements in Civil Wars,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3 (June 2009), 463. 
40 Zartman and Touval, “International Mediation,”443. 
41 Peter J. Carnevale and Sharon Arad, “Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation,” Resolving 
International Conflicts: Theory and Practice of Mediation, ed. Jacob Bercovitch (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1996), 49. 
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influential in the mediation process, as the parties do not believe that they favor one side. 
As Marieke Kleiboer describes it: “From the perspective of the disputing parties, a biased 
mediator may be an attractive option as long as the mediator has particularly strong ties 
to the party with greater control over the outcome of the conflict.”42 She further explains  
that partiality is usually the exception because “peacemaking is often intertwined with 
less-altruistic self-interests of mediators.”43 
Context factors play a significant role in mediation outcomes. Conflict issues are 
considered the most important factor followed by the nature of the parties. Within the 
literature, there remains disagreement on the influence of the mediator or how attributes 
of the mediator affect mediation outcomes. 
2. Process Factors 
Some scholars examine mediator strategy as a factor in mediation outcomes. A 
mediator’s perception of the conflict, the resource availability and the parties’ perception 
of the mediator are the basis for mediator strategy. Throughout the literature, there are 
different terms for mediator strategy based on the involvement of mediators in the 
mediation initiative. The level of involvement escalates from facilitative to formulative to 
manipulative. The communication-facilitation mediator is an information channel; he/she 
identifies issues to establish a common ground for negotiations, gains parties’ trust, and 
builds communication bridges between the parties.44 The communication-facilitation 
mediator is an intermediary between the parties. The formulative mediator proposes 
solutions and actively attempts to overcome stalemates in the negotiation process.45 The 
formulative mediator brings the parties together and, through persuasion, attempts to 
resolve dispute issues. The formulative mediator actively provides options but has no 
force to implement solutions. The manipulator uses power and resources to push the 
                                                 
42 Kleiboer, “Understanding Success,” 370. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Bercovitch, “Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory,” 137. 
45 Ibid., 138. 
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parties to a resolution.46 The manipulator is a full participant in the negotiations and often 
directs parties toward solutions. Researchers cite common ground that certain strategies 
have more likely outcomes, but there is no consensus that one is better or worse. What 
strategies the mediators use depends on the context in which they are working. Mediators 
determine their strategy based on context conditions, resources at their disposal and 
outcome expectations.  
Quinn et al. argue that asymmetric conflicts favor a facilitative approach that 
allowed “parties to control the process while helping them to have fuller information 
about their relative capabilities ... and improve their relationship with each other.”47 The 
facilitative approach opens lines of communication that previously had been closed. If 
one party is unaware of the other’s demands, then they could communicate through a 
facilitative mediator to discover important issues. This discovery goes beyond a 
mediator’s proposal of solutions or forceful demands; it establishes an open channel 
where parties could interact in a way that was previously unavailable. The arguments in 
the literature delineate that post-settlement agreements are most secure when mediators 
use facilitation because the actors produce their own solutions through voluntary 
discussion.48  
Kyle C. Beardsley et al. share similar views. They find that “formulative and 
manipulative forms of mediation are strongly associated with the achievement of formal 
agreements.”49 Mediators who are more involved and forceful present options that parties 
might otherwise not consider or accept. Unlike the findings of Quinn et al., those of 
Bearsley et al. relate to the mediation of parties who were affiliated with each other and 
recognize the positions of the other party. Additionally, scholars consistently report that 
manipulation is the most effective style of mediation for securing a formal agreement and 
reducing tension in the short term.50  
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Quinn et al., “Power Play,” 209. 
48 Ibid., 81. 
49 Beardsley et al., “Mediation Style,” 77. 
50 Ibid. 
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The downside of the manipulative strategy is that rather than negotiating for an 
acceptable solution, parties could wait for resolution? Manipulative strategies could 
achieve a short-term solution because mediators could force parties into a settlement that 
they might later abrogate. Thus, longer-term peace is not well advanced with the 
manipulative approach. While they may take longer to halt hostilities, facilitative or 
formulative strategies work better in the longer run. These approaches allow parties to 
reach an acceptable, mutually determined solution, which could be more binding as 
parties adopt resolutions of their own free will.  
All scholars agree that mediators base their strategies on what they believe could 
work best and what tools are available. Within the literature, no single approach had a 
universal outcome and mediators must work within and adapt to the mediation 
environment in order to influence mediation outcomes. Though different strategies may 
be employed, mediators may not be effective because the timing of the mediation is not 
right.  
3. Mediation Ripeness 
While there is some disagreement in the literature about whether “ripeness” is an 
attribute of either conflict context or the mediation process, authors widely agree that 
mediation success rates are highest during “ripe” moments.51 Patrick M. Regan and Allan 
Stam are unable to identify “the specific timing of a ‘tipping point’ … and the timing of 
diplomacy has important implications for subsequent duration of a dispute, and that 
tipping points or ‘ripe periods’ exist more likely than not.”52 Mediation outcomes are 
more likely to be positive when mediation is attempted at the right time, but scholars do 
not agree on the conditions that forecast a ripe negotiation period. Greig and Diehl argue: 
                                                 
51 Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives,”10; J. Michael Greig, “Moments of Opportunity: 
Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation Between Enduring Rivals,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 45, no. 6 (Dec 2001), 694; Dean G. Pruitt, “Whither Ripeness Theory,” Institute for 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Working Paper 25/2005 (Washington, DC: George Mason University, 
2005): accessed on 15 August 2013, http://scar.gmu.edu/wp_25_pruitt.pdf; Dean G. Pruitt,“Readiness 
Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict,” American Behavioral Scientist 50, no. II (2007); Patrick M. 
Regan and Allan C. Stam, “In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the 
Duration of Interstate Disputes,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no 2 (June 2000): 239–260. 
 52 Regan and Stam, “In the Nick of Time,” 256. 
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One barrier to successful mediation is getting the parties to the bargaining 
table under conditions when mediation is most likely to be successful. In 
general, however, third parties do not offer mediation when it is apt to be 
fruitful. This disconnect between the timing of mediation and its success is 
problematic for two reasons. First, it suggests that third parties waste time 
and energy offering mediation to disputants when it is unlikely to yield 
positive results. Failed mediation efforts, in turn, run the risk of 
convincing disputants of the impossibility of managing their conflict, 
potentially spoiling future mediation efforts. Second, because third parties 
do not offer mediation when it is most likely to be successful, those 
conflicts that need third-party assistance the most may not receive the 
assistance of a mediator when they most need it.53 
Some practitioners observe that repeat episodes of mediation do not necessarily 
improve chances for conflict resolution, but negative experiences appear to decrease 
future positive mediation outcomes.54 Positive mediation experiences between two 
disputants tend to facilitate more constructive talks in the future, while “the buildup of 
hostility and past negative interactions make this a difficult context in which to achieve 
diplomatic progress.”55 These findings, while unsurprising, are notable; mediations that 
continually produce negative results are likely to reduce both the willingness of parties to 
negotiate and their perceptions of mediation as a viable option to end violent conflict. 
Lederach, however, suggests that ripe moments do not just happen but are “cultivated.”56 
Failed mediation efforts do not necessarily decrease parties’ interest to mediation but 
allow for the development a relationship between the parties; ripeness is nurtured through 
a process of interactions and facilitates, rather than impedes, successful future mediation 
outcomes.57 Timing is an important consideration; mediation at the wrong time could 
negatively affect mediation outcomes. 
                                                 
53 Greig and Diehl, International Mediation, 136. 
54 Bercovitch and Jackson, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century, 43. 
55 Greig and Diehl, International Mediation, 133. 
56 Lederach, “Cultivating Peace,” 34–35. Mediation ripeness can be cultivated by the mediator. 
External conditions can agents and conditions can also make mediation ripe by creating incentives that 
push or pull the belligerents to compromise.  
57 Ibid. 
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Ripeness is built on the parties’ readiness to negotiate, a perception, and 
circumstances within and outside the conflict and the alternatives that mediation offers to 
violent conflict. Zartman argues that a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) is a necessary 
precondition for mediation.58 An MHS occurs when “the parties find themselves locked 
in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to 
both of them.”59 MHS explains the desire for mediation based on a need to mediate as the 
best available option. A mutually enticing opportunity (MEO) is the perception that 
mediation offers benefits that cannot be achieved through continued conflict or the “issue 
of the conflict becomes dépassé, no longer justifying the bad relations with the other 
party.60 MEO provides incentives for mediation based on future expectations and not the 
current conflict dilemma. Greig argues that “ripeness occurs when both states [actors] 
increasingly become willing to move toward less conflictual strategies to achieve a 
mutually satisfactory outcome.”61 Pruitt’s readiness theory argues that actors are more 
likely to settle due to optimism instead of the last available option.62 Within the 
literature, scholars recognize that parties must perceive mediation, based on positive or 
negative consequences, as the best option for achieving their aims.  
There is consensus in the literature that ripeness is perhaps the most important 
factor, following the nature of the dispute, in determining mediation outcomes: if neither 
party is ready to put down arms and negotiate, any talks would fail to make positive 
strides toward ending the conflict. Conflict that is ripe for resolution results from 
significant change in belligerents’ attitudes and a corresponding acceptance of mediation 
as a viable solution for mediation. Mediators could influence ripeness by providing a 
forum for mediation, offering solutions, or creating more favorable conditions through 
the use of sticks and carrots.  But mediation ripeness is also influenced by factors not 
directly related to the mediator that convince the parties to view mediation as a better 
                                                 
58 Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives,” 8. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 14. 
61 Greig, “Moments of Opportunity,” 694 
62 Pruitt, “Whither Ripeness Theory,” 8. 
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option than violence. Within the literature, scholars note that ripe moments are contingent 
on a number of context and process factors that could influence mediation outcomes. 
These include the parties’ readiness and optimism for mediation, resources of a capable 
mediator, and strategies that support party interests and bring them together. The weight 
of influence of these variables continually changes. However, there is recognition within 
the field that “there are situations where mediation simply cannot achieve anything 
proactively or reactively.”63 
4. Mediation Outcomes 
There is little agreement in the literature on what constitutes successful or failed 
mediation.64 Authors generally evaluate mediation outcomes by both objective and 
subjective criteria. In looking at subjective evaluations, the literature identifies successful 
mediation when “the parties express satisfaction with the process of mediation, or when 
the outcome is seen as fair, efficient, or effective.”65 Conversely, objective criteria “rely 
on substantial indicators that can be demonstrated empirically ... if it contributed to the 
cessation or reduction of violent behavior.”66 This thesis used objective criteria to 
measure success or failure. Mediation was successful if it ended conflict or reduced 
hostilities.  
It is important to note that there are varying degrees of success and failure. A 
mediation effort might fail to address substantive issues, but if throughout negotiations 
parties made agreements on technical issues or agenda items, then it would bring the 
disputants together. While this may not be enough to categorize the talks as successful, it 
does create an environment that encourages brokering deals in the future. Piecemeal or 
incremental mediation efforts and improvements could build to eventual success. 
Agreements between belligerents may see consent on issues or points of negotiation such 
as the following: temporary ceasefire, a framework for discussion, access for 
                                                 
63 Bercovitch and Jackson, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century, 37. 
 64 Kleiboer, “Understanding Success,” 361–362. Kleiboer provides a clear analysis of the current 
arguments surrounding mediation success and effectiveness.  
 65 Bercovitch, “Mediation in International Conflict,” 147. 
 66 Ibid., 148. 
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international humanitarian intervention, or a consensus on terms to continue further 
discussion amidst a continuing conflict.  
Sudan civil war mediations were selected for analysis to develop an 
understanding of what context and process factors were most influential in affecting 
mediation outcomes. Instead of simply listing relevant factors, this thesis explores how 
and why context and mediation process variables discussed in the literature review 
affected mediation success or failure. Sudan mediation effort analysis allowed process 
tracing analysis of mediation context and process factors that scholars suggest throughout 
the literature are influential to mediation outcomes. Analysis of Sudan allowed the author 
to contribute to the literature and mediator understanding of when, why, and how 
mediation should or should not be attempted. Identifying the final result (success or 
failure) allowed the tracing of events, personalities, and circumstances that contributed to 
the mediation outcomes.   
If the primary objective of ending violence was not achieved, this thesis will 
consider the mediation outcome a failure. There may be success throughout the talks 
(settlement on minor issues), but if the conflict continues, the mediation outcome was a 
failure. Thus, in the Sudanese civil war between the GoS and SPLM/A, mediation failed 
in the Abuja Peace Conference and IGAD I and succeeded in phases I and II of IGAD II.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
The mediation’s historical dimension served as the foundation to identify what 
factors influenced mediation, and how and why those factors affected the outcome. This 
thesis used process tracing to establish a casual mechanism between the mediation 
context, process and outcome. The study investigated four competing hypotheses: 
1. Both context and process are equally important for determining mediation 
outcomes; 
2. Context is more important than process in determining mediation 
outcomes;  
3. Process is more important than context in mediation outcomes;  
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4. Some other category of variables is the most important in determining 
mediation outcome. 
Additionally, this research employed the contingency approach to mediation that 
“treats the outcomes of mediation efforts (be they successful or unsuccessful) as 
dependent, or contingent, upon the environment (or context) of a conflict and the manner 
of behavior within it (i.e., process).”67  Using the literature as a guide, this thesis 
evaluated factors of mediation and explained how and why those factors influenced 
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Table 1.   Factors Influencing Mediation Outcome 
The nature of the dispute, the most important factor in mediation outcomes, is 
excluded from analysis here because it is relatively constant in the cases. Removing 
conflict issues from the pool of analysis allowed this thesis to focus on factors other than 
the primary driver of conflict between the SPLM/A and GoS that are less understood and 
accepted in the literature. The nature of the conflict is an important issue, but with the 
commonly accepted factor of mediation outcomes removed, the author could look at the 
weight and influence of other factors on mediation outcomes.  
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Throughout the conflict and during mediation, religion and the state, self-
determination, wealth sharing, an interim period for referendum, cease-fire, and power 
sharing were the central issues of debate.68 Peace between the parties in Sudan remained 
elusive until the GoS and SPLM/A agreed to a different government structure for the 
south, that did not include Sharia as the basis for the government, gave the south the right 
to self-determine, identified political representation responsibilities, distributed wealth 
between the North and South, and established a cease-fire. The conflict was a result of 
political, economic, racial, ethnic, and religious marginalization of the periphery 
(southern Sudan) by those at that center, which the government manifested in its 
policies.69 Sudan writ large suffered from a center versus the periphery dynamic.70 
Mediation between the SPLM/A and the GoS focused on changing the government’s 
dynamic to allow the North to maintain its power, wealth, and Islamic character, while 
giving the south autonomy of rule, access to resources, and a secular character. Removing 
the nature of the dispute allowed this thesis to focus on belligerents’ nature, mediator 
attributes, mediation strategy, and the condition of conflict ripeness for mediation.  
  
                                                 
68 Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1998), 172–186; Douglas H. Johnson, African Issues: The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 2003): xi; Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive 
Quest for Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006): 101–125; Atta el-Battahani, “A Complex Web: Politics 
and Conflict in Sudan,” in Accord Sudan: Peace by Piece 18 (2006): 10–12; Umberto Tavolato, “The 
Peace Process in Sudan: North-South Accord or East-West Discord?” Centro Studio (7 April 2004) 
accessed 15 August 2013, 
http://www.centrostudidonati.org/documenti/PEACE_PROCESS_IN_SUDAN.pdf.  
69 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 212–213; International Crisis Group, God, Oil and 
Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002), 93–106; John 
Young, The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process (New York: Zed 
Books, 2012), 1–16. 
70 Johnson, African Issues, xi; El-Battahani, “A Complex Web,”10–12. 
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND PARTIES TO SUDANESE 
CIVIL WAR MEDIATION 
The history of Sudan is riddled with conflict and tensions that resulted in multiple 
civil wars. A question of state legitimacy and attempts by one group to dominate others 
resulted in civil wars and changes in regime. Internal and external interventions 
privileged few at the cost of many. Governments used political power to manipulate state 
resources, gain economic benefits, control or eliminate civil institutions, and maintain 
power on the basis of racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities. Throughout 
Sudanese history, divide and rule tactics resulted in “underdevelopment, exclusion, and 
violent conflict.”71 The inability of the state to address diversity and pluralism resulted in 
uneven economic development, political marginalization, and two civil wars, the second 
of which lasted more than 20 years from 1983 to 2005.72 The conflict was not based on a 
single division between North and South but “a complex armed conflict of ‘interlocking 
civil wars.’”73 Successful mediation needed to address a history of complex disparities 
and disjointedness within Sudan. This section looks at the historical dimensions of 
marginalization within Sudan and examines the two major parties that fought and 
negotiated during the Abuja and IGAD peace initiatives.  
A. HISTORY OF SUDAN 
Most portray the Sudanese conflict as a struggle between the “Arab” North and 
“African” South based on language and religious differences. The issues involved in the 
conflict, however, were far more complex.74 The fracture within Sudanese society began 
with Turco-Egyptian rule, and splintered further during the Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium. Post-independence military and civilian regimes internalized and 
perpetuated the fragmentations through “Arabization” and “Islamization” programs after 
                                                 
71 El-Battahani, “A Complex Web,” 10. 
72 Ibid 
73 Ibid. 
74 Iyob and. Khadiagala, Sudan, 19; El-Battahani, “A Complex Web,” 10–14. 
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independence in 1956. In the history of modern Sudan, racism, religious fanaticism, 
political and economic marginalization, disputed national identity, and minority control 
of government and resources led to inequality not only between the North and South, but 
also for all regions distant from Khartoum.75 Persisting since the start of the modern era, 
the conflicts within Sudan resulted from the center marginalizing the periphery and the 
center’s attempt to control state through policies that undermined citizen equality and 
promoted a privileged few.76 
Modern Sudanese history began with the Turco-Egyptian conquest of the northern 
and central regions of Sudan by Muhammad ‘Ali in 1821 and expanded in 1870 when 
annexation extended to the southern regions.77 Turco-Egyptian rule ended in 1882 when 
Muhammad Ahmad, a man claiming to be the Mahdi led a “national liberation movement 
that delivered Sudan from the yoke of Turkish rule.”78  In 1898, a combined British and 
Egyptian army defeated the Mahdist theocratic state. The British and Egyptians divided 
the sovereignty of Sudan by implementing the Anglo-Egyptian condominium from 1899–
1955 and established joint rule of the territory. Though Egypt gained independence from 
Britain in 1922, it was not until 1956 that Britain and Egypt relinquished control of 
Sudan.  
The origins of southern Sudanese society’s marginalization stem from Turco-
Egyptian favoritism for peoples and villages of the northern riverine areas. The Turco-
Egyptian government supported Arab Northerners, Ottoman, and European businessmen, 
in slave raids to the south and developed the northern riverine areas of Sudan with 
administrative structures, education facilities, communication and security infrastructure 
to expand commerce throughout the regions.79 The government permitted slaving and 
                                                 
75Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 3–45. 
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77 Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan Since the Mahdiya (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 6.  
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natural resources extraction but made little effort toward developing social or political 
structures to support society. Much of the development took place in the central riverine 
areas.80 Outlying areas remained undeveloped and suffered from political and economic 
marginalization.81  Disaffected by Turco-Egyptian rule, Muhammad Ahmad (the Mahdi) 
revolted and overthrew the regime in response to slave trading, taxation, and corruption 
within the government. Dying shortly after the overthrow, Mahdi followers attempted to 
create a policy that was based on the Quran.82  
British and Egyptian forces returned in 1888 and defeated Mahdist forces and 
recaptured Khartoum. While they did not wish to fully colonize Sudan, they did not want 
other European colonial powers to have control of the region.83 The British and 
Egyptians established a condominium agreement that allowed the British rule without the 
corresponding financial expense of regional government and put in place a bifurcated 
strategy to manage religious differences and governance in northern and southern 
Sudan.84 British policies sought to limit the influence of Islam (by allowing the spread of 
Christianity and prohibiting Muslim proselytizing) in the South but promoted the use of 
Islam to improve governance in the North. From British perspective, the “primitive and 
pagan” South needed to be protected from the North.85  
Britain remained disconnected from heavy administrative engagement in the 
South until 1930 when its policies became more forceful in establishing a “Christian 
South that would have a non-Islamic, non-Arabic, and non-Northern identity.”86 The 
British sought to limit both Egyptian and Muslim influence in the south, but in so doing 
                                                 
80 Andrew S. Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: 
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86 Khalid, War and Peace in Sudan, 20. 
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undermined Southern progress and development.87 While the British favored the South, 
the majority of development and investment in infrastructure occurred in the northern 
riverine areas. The southern population, it was argued, did not want to develop.88 
In the run up to independence, the British agreed, against the desires of southern 
politicians, to keep the South within a united Sudan.89 The Juba Conference in 1955 
marginalized southern representatives and the northern majority paid lip service to their 
aspirations for independence or equal representation within the government. Instead, 
Northerners placated Southerners with half-hearted guarantees that they would address 
their issues of equal representation, protection of minority rights and separate political 
status for the South following independence.90 Throughout the pre-colonial and colonial 
period, four themes affected Sudanese society and created tension within the state: (1) 
International intervention that undermined indigenous rule and complicated the 
relationship between government and local populations, (2) a pejorative view of the 
South, (3) the use of religion as tool to govern the state, and (4) the marginalization of 
peripheral regions (specifically the South). These issues were complicated with regime 
changes, civil war, and unequal resource distribution after independence. 
The regime changed a number of times between independence in January 1956 
and June 1989. A democratically elected civilian government ruled until a coup d’état in 
1958 installed a military dictatorship, under the rule of Major General Ibrahim Abbud. In 
1964, a popular rebellion overthrew Abbud and installed a transitional national civilian 
government. In 1969, Jaafar Numeiri led a military coup and assumed the presidency. He 
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remained president until 1985 when a group of officers overthrew him and established 
the Transitional Military Council (TMC) to rule the country. A coalition government 
formed in 1986 and elected Sadiq al-Mahdi as prime minister. Al-Mahdi would remain 
prime minister until 30 June 1989 when a coup d’état organized by Hassan al-Turabi and 
executed by Omar al-Bashir established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) 
government under the control of the National Islamic Front (NIF). In 1993, Bashir 
assumed the presidency and powers of the RCC while Turabi served in various political 
government positions and head of the NIF. Leadership within the NIF and government 
remained unchallenged until Islamic leader and Speaker of the Parliament Turabi 
attempted to amend the constitution to weaken the presidency. Bashir dissolved the 
National Assembly, reshuffled the cabinet, and removed those loyal to Turabi. The NIF 
split into two parties; the National Congress Party (NCP) maintained allegiance to Bashir 
and Turabi established the Popular National Congress (PNC).91  
Domestic and foreign policy of the GoS (regardless of the government) 
throughout the independence of Sudan promoted the power of the regime and 
undermined those who did not share a common ideology. It was through the state and 
with religion as a tool that governments attempted to consolidate their power. Following 
independence, the southern population was immediately disadvantaged in its political 
representation within the government and lost the ability to negotiate or mount a 
challenge against laws that favored political prerogatives of the majority and disregarded 
minority rights of the South.92 Political, economic and military power remained 
centralized in the riverine region while other regions suffered from underdevelopment 
and underrepresentation.93 The government initiated no development projects in the 
South and provided little support for equality between different peoples in the state. 
Those in power executed policy based on their own interests.  
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Who controlled the state and competition between political parties determined the 
extent of government policies that undermined minority protections and the relationship 
between the government (center) and the south (periphery). Elites enacted regulations for 
a single language (Arabic) and religion (Islam) within the state to gain power within the 
state and create a national identity that would support elite control of the country.94 
Unrest in the south increased as the political rights were curtailed.95  Underrepresented in 
government and unwilling to accept government policies that disregarded southern 
aspirations for equal treatment and protections, civil war erupted between the government 
and southern rebel groups in 1955 and continued until 1971.96 
The first civil war continued until Numeiri negotiated a self-governing status for 
the South with the Addis Ababa Accord that gave the South limited authority over 
education, police, cultural development, an independent budget, and guaranteed equal 
opportunity.97 Numeiri reneged on the Addis Ababa Accord and implemented Sharia 
through the September laws following a decade of failed economic programs and his 
perception that Sudan had become a backward state.98  
The second civil war began in 1983 after Numeiri abrogated the Addis Ababa 
Accord, ended Southern autonomy, and implemented the September Laws. Numeiri’s 
removal, establishment of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and election of Sadiq 
al-Mahdi (Umma Party) brought potential peace to the civil war with the Koka Dam 
Declaration, but objections from competing political parties (NIF and Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP)) prevented a peace resolution.99  In the late 1980s, political 
alliances shifted between the DUP, NIF, and Umma party in an effort to gain control of 
the state.100 The DUP attempted reconciliation with the SPLM/A through the Sudanese 
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Peace Initiative in 1988, and Mahdi drafted legislation to suspend Islamic laws but failed 
to persuade parliament to adopt legislation that would end to Islamic foundation of the 
constitution. The NIF staunchly disapproved of the change from Sharia within the 
country.101 
Turabi, Bashir, and the NIF overthrew the Mahdi regime in June 1989 concerned 
that the government would negotiate peace with the SPLM/A. The RCC suspended the 
constitution and dissolved political institutions and Bashir replaced the leadership in 
government, military, business and civil service positions with pro-NIF personnel.102 
From the shadows, Turabi militarized the state and implemented the Islamic Civilization 
Project, a program to force Arabization and Islamization throughout Sudan.103  
The NIF was ruthless in its attempt to spread Islam but its intentions varied little 
from previous regimes. Abbud, Numeiri, and Mahdi each encountered the question of 
religion and the state and used religion as a means for the state to control the population. 
It also provided a means for the government to consolidate power. It further allowed the 
central government to marginalize the periphery and look at the South as subordinate and 
in need of ideological reform. These policies drove the South to war in 1983. 
John Garang established the SPLM/A in 1983 to fight against the GoS and for 
a “ ‘New Sudan’ of social, economic, and political equality.” The relationship of between 
the GoS and SPLM/A waxed and waned based on the battlefield positions their forces. 
When the SPLM/A military prowess threatened elite power in Khartoum the government 
demonstrated greater willingness to acquiesce to political demands. When the opposite 
occurred the GoS pursued its radical political programs more intensely.  
SPLM/A and GoS military strength varied throughout the conflict. The SPLM/A 
achieved military victories, captured provincial capitals and disrupted government supply 
lines throughout the late 1980s but then suffered losses throughout the early 1990s. The 
SPLM/A did not again present a military challenge to the GoS until the mid-1990s and 
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remained a formidable military challenger to the GoS until the end of IGAD negotiations. 
Conversely, the GoS became militarily dominant following the 1989 coup and remained 
so until the middle of the 1990s. SPLMA/A and GoS military forces came to a point of 
power parity in the late 1990s with neither party commanding dominance on the 
battlefield. Throughout the conflict both sides sought to improve their capabilities and 
overcome defeats through alliances with external and internal actors. The nature of the 
military relationship between the SPLM/A and GoS continually affected whether the 
parties saw mediation as a viable alternative to violence.104  
The continued conflict brought international attention and multiple attempts to 
settle the dispute peacefully. Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida attempted mediation 
between the GoS and SPLM/A in the Abuja Peace Conferences from 1992–1993. From 
1994–2001, IGAD conducted the first round of peace talks between the GoS and 
SPLM/A. IGAD peace talks broke down in October 1994 and did not resume until July 
1997, and then continued intermittently through 2005.  
The history of the civil wars and the mediation efforts between the SPLM/A and 
GoS will be further discussed in the chapters that follow. The history leading up to the 
Abuja and IGAD mediation efforts shows continual government instability that was 
based on internal challenges of gaining control of the state and political parties’ desire to 
implement programs that would increase their power. Inequality between the North and 
the South was continued through domestic policies of successive governments. 
Regardless of regime type or government personnel, the policy of Khartoum was always 
to promote an Arab-Muslim national identity, while minimizing resource distribution 
outside the center-northern core. War resulted from the marginalization and inequality 
between those in the center-north who ruled the country and periphery regions.  
B. NATURE OF THE PARTIES: A COMPARISON 
The GoS and the SPLM/A were the two principal parties to the second Sudan 
civil war. As discussed in the literature review under nature of the party, party ideology, 
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leadership, organization, fractionalization, and power parity are characteristics that 
impact mediation outcomes. The nature of the parties throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s impacted the mediation outcomes of the Abuja and IGAD mediation efforts. This 
section provides an overview of issues that affected the parties’ readiness to negotiate and 
impacted whether the conflict was ripe for resolution.  
The SPLM/A was the southern opposition group that fought against the GoS for 
southern equality. Since its establishment in 1983, the SPLM/A was beleaguered by 
internal dissention, authoritarian rule, unclear and contradictory political objectives, and 
accused of human rights abuses.105 However, it also demonstrated durability on the 
battlefield and an unyielding attitude in its cause.  
The NIF was a political organization founded by Turabi and came to power in 
1989 through a coup d’état.106 It was initially ideologically united on state-wide 
Islamization and Arabization as a means to maintain power, but its stature was 
undermined by elite power struggles and changing political and socio-economic 
conditions. The NIF (and later NCP) faced domestic and internal opposition that 
threatened its control of the government. It operated in an authoritarian manner and 
undermined any institutions that would reduce its power within Sudan. 
1. Party Ideology  
Ideology is a system of ideals or ideas, a vision maintained by an individual or a 
group.107 Parties who are unwilling to compromise are those who are averse to modifying 
their ideology and this will negative affect mediation outcomes. Furthermore, if there are 
competing visions within a party, it is difficult to reach a settlement because individuals 
or sub-groups may be fighting and negotiating for different objectives.  
The SPLM/A was a guerrilla army that faced internal divisions throughout the 
1990s. Peter Adwok Nyaba wrote that “The SPLM/A ... is an amalgam of political and 
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ideological trends united by a common objective of national liberation. ... It was the 
apparent disregard, slighting and marginalization of other political opinions that 
precipitated the contradictions resulting in armed confrontation within.”108  The SPLM/A 
sought national liberation but what that meant varied. Waithaka Waihenya observed that 
Garang viewed the conflict not solely in terms of southern autonomy, but as “a bigger 
question of self-determination, the need to transform the whole Sudan into a multi-racial, 
multi-religion and multi-ethnic democratic state.”109 Garang promoted a message of a 
united multi-ethnic, secular state, absent of the “center verses the periphery” social, 
economic, and political imbalance in Sudan.110 Collins identified a deep divide between 
unity and separation within the SPLM/A that surfaced soon after its founding.111  In fact, 
Oran R. Young noted that “when some later found out that under Garang the SPLM/A 
was actually committed to unity and socialism, they defected.… Support for a united 
Sudan never had much resonance among politically engaged southerners.”112 Not all 
SPLM/A members supported the administration and operations of the leadership. “The 
SPLM/A policies and practices ran counter to the expectation of many who joined it,” 
according to Nyaba. 113 Power struggles within the SPLM/A affected the strength of the 
guerrilla army and undermined its ability to fight the GoS. 
The NIF became the ruling party of Sudan following a coup d’etat engineered by 
Turabi and executed by Omar Bashir on 30 June 1989.114 Once in power the NIF 
government “destroyed or bent political institutions to thief needs, including in the areas 
of education civil society, the military and police.”115 Arabization and Islamization 
programs sought to create an Islamist state that would be a beacon of the Muslim 
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community.116 An Islamic state was a continuous goal of the NIF but “government 
policies were mainly engineered to weaken political opponents and enhance the NIF’s 
economic and political power base.”117 The NIF used “Islam as a mobilizing force ... as a 
tool of opportunity, a protective shield” but “the government is driven more by a desire to 
hold on to office than any ideological agenda.”118 Young noted that “where the NCP 
differed from other ruling parties was in its refusal to recognize other interests and 
perspectives, [and] the extent to which it was prepared to use violence to realize its 
objectives.”119 A shared vision within the NIF (and later NCP) government sought 
exclusionary power and complete control of the state.  
2. Leadership and Organization 
NIF and SPLM/A leadership were obstacles to successful mediation outcomes 
during the Abuja and first IGAD mediation efforts. The ideology that Turabi and Garang 
presented to their respective groups undermined their ability to maintain power and 
ultimately reduced the capability of mediators to bridge the gaps between the parties. The 
elites in both organizations attempted to maintain power through ruthless methods. 
Mediation outcomes could not change until the elites changed their tactics or were 
removed from positions of power.    
Garang was ruthless in his control of the SPLM/A. In 1984, he killed the Anya 
Nya II leader Gai Tui and assumed command of all SPLM/A forces.120  Within the ranks 
of the SPLM/A he was a feared leader who “was reputed to command obedience.”121 
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Nyaba commented that “it would have been foolhardy to come to the open against the 
SPLM/A leadership ... it was extremely dangerous and many lost their lives on flimsy 
charges of being against the leadership of Dr. John Garang.”122 On the other hand, 
Garang was a military professional who could inspire his forces.123 Collins noted that 
“Garang’s leadership had been dictatorial, but his leadership had achieved a cohesion and 
coordination that had produced a succession of military victories.”124 Garang’s methods 
were questioned but he guided the SPLM/A through military defeats and uncertain times.  
The SPLM/A claimed to be fighting for the rights of southern Sudanese but as an 
organization did little in social or economic development in the areas it liberated.125 
Collins noted:  
The SPLM/A was basically a peasant army with little political 
consciousness. It was divorced from the concerns of ordinary southerners, 
concentrating solely on military force to achieve success without any 
popular participation...  Not surprisingly, the movement created a military 
elite of senior officers who abused their authority for the sake of self-
promotion ... they were devoid of any sense of accountability, 
responsibility or criticism of leadership.126  
Hilde F. Johnson reported that throughout the 1990s the SPLM/A “was riddled with 
factionalism and infighting ... the disastrous result was now a North-South War around 
which orbited various warlords, whose gravitational pull ebbed and flowed in relation to 
such variables as material, foreign support, access to relief supplies and shady deals 
between” the GoS and SPLM/A.127 The SPLM/A was shaken a number of times but 
never broke. Its ability sustain itself was equaled by the self-preservation of the NIF. The 
focus of the SPLM/A elites was the military campaign. Satisfying the desires of the elites, 
and not the people would influence mediation outcomes.  
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Turabi built the NIF and his power through the loyalty of those who shared his 
beliefs of ideological purity.128  He recruited members throughout the government, 
business community and military. Taha and Bashir were two of those recruits. Once in 
power Turabi maintained control of the NIF, leading from the shadows while Bashir 
served as President.129 Collins described Turabi as “the theological architect, patron, and 
shaykh of the Islamist revolution” and stated that Bashir was a “devoted follower.”130 
Andrew S. Natsios wrote that Bashir was “a general first, last, and always but developed 
the skills needed to traverse the factional infighting, Byzantine intrigue, and bureaucratic 
intricacies of Khartoum politics.”131 Taha was “reflective in nature,” according to 
Johnson.  He was an intellectual who “saw issues from different angles, discerning what 
was possible and what was not; he was a pragmatist.”132 Unlike Turabi, Taha maintained 
a vision of Islamic Sudan but he could find space to compromise.133 Turabi was never 
able to dissect reality from ideology; “his mission was to define the ideology and 
objectives that would inspire others ... but contradictions and ambiguities of his thought 
and speech obscured the path to the utopian world of peace.”134 The Turabi and Bashir 
relationship ruptured due to equal desires for power. Bashir could amend his perspective, 
Turabi, was unable to do so. 
When the NIF split, Taha joined Bashir in the NCP, but the relationship between 
Bashir and Taha was not without a power struggle. Johnson commented on the 
significance of the dynamic: “Control of the Army and strong relations with the 
intelligence services have been critical for Bashir’s ability to remain in power.”135  
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Conversely, Taha was a leader within the Muslim community, politically well 
connected, and in 2002, was “widely believed in the international community at the time 
to be the real power holder in the region.”136 Taha, while not a religious zealot like 
Turabi, had strong ties to his Islamic faith and was politically shrewd; Bashir’s power 
was in the military establishment. The power dynamics between Bashir and Taha 
mirrored that of Bashir and Turabi. The difference was that Taha was practical in his 
outlook of Islam in Sudan and had not spoiled his international image as Turabi had.137 
The change in elite visions created circumstances that opened the door for options other 
than violence to maintain NCP control of the state.  
The SPLM/A and NIF elites were used similar methods to maintain power. Each 
was uncompromising, dedicated to a singular political philosophy, and dictatorial in 
preserving power. The irony of the SPLM/A and NIF programs was that each sought to 
bring together incongruent groups (Khartoum vis-à-vis the South, the SPLM/A vis-à-vis 
rebel groups within Sudan) but their programs were so extreme that rebellion was created 
instead of conciliation.  
3. Power Parity 
The power parity between the SPLM/A and GoS continually influenced the Abuja 
and IGAD mediation outcomes. Though this will be evaluated further in the following 
chapters, the mediation outcomes and willingness of the SPLM/A and GoS to 
compromise were influenced by conduct on the battlefield. The GoS was ardent in its 
positions when it was politically isolated from internal discord, militarily successful on 
the battlefield and maintained a dominant position over the SPLM/A. When the GoS 
faced military losses and the NIF political stature threatened, it compromised on 
agreements. The SPLM/A remained stalwart in its positions when it was close to military 
defeat and when it perceived itself to be politically and militarily able to defeat the GoS. 
It was not until the SPLM/A perceived that the GoS would once again militarily gain the 
                                                 
136 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process,” 19.  
137 Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, 218–20, 228. Turabi’s support of the Osama Bin Laden, 
“Carlos the Jackal,” Iraq during the Gulf War and involvement in the Mubarak assignation attempt brought 
international criticism on the GoS and discredited Turabi’s image.  
 35 
upper hand that it was more serious in using mediation as a means to end the violent 
conflict. Asymmetry between the SPLM/A and GoS mirrored the willingness of the 
parties to negotiate.  
This chapter presents the party ideology, leadership, and organization of the NIF 
and SPLM/A. It further looks at the power symmetry between the GoS and SPLM/A. 
Each party held different visions for the future of Sudan and the manner in which they 
operated and maintained power was similar. Internal dissention within the SPLM/A and 
the NIF destabilized both parties. The nature of the parties throughout the period affected 
mediation ripeness and ultimately the mediation outcomes of Abuja and IGAD peace 
initiatives. Mediation ripeness is a critical factor to mediation outcomes. The nature of 
the parties is a significant variable in determining if the conflict is ripe for resolution. 
This thesis argues that the nature of the parties was the significant factor in determining 
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III. ABUJA PEACE CONFERENCES 
The SPLM/A and GoS participated in the Abuja peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria. 
The first Abuja talks occurred from 26 May to 4 June 1992 and the second from 26 April 
to 18 May 1993. Nigerian President and Organization of African Unity (OAU) Chairman 
Ibrahim Babangida was the mediation chair. The Abuja peace initiative failed to achieve 
an agreement and end violent conflict between the SPLM/A and the GoS, although the 
talks were successful in bringing issues of the dispute to the forefront. When the parties 
departed Abuja, there was no longer a question about what the belligerents wanted.138 
The mediators facilitated the identification of issues but were unable to influence the 
parties to amend their positions.  
This chapter looks at the mediation session between the SPLM/A and GoS during 
the Abuja peace talks. Throughout the negotiations the SPLM/A was on the brink of 
military defeat and the GoS was unbending in its stance on a united Sudan and an Islamic 
and Arab national identity. Khartoum was at a high point in its military campaign after 
recently seizing SPLM/A-Torit’s headquarters (with SPLM/A-Nasir’s assistance) and 
GoS military power advantages created an arrogant attitude on the part of its mediation 
delegation.139 The SPLM/A negotiated from a destitute position unwilling to compromise 
its desire for governance in the South that was free from Sharia or overt federal 
government intrusion. The Abuja conferences occurred at the wrong time when neither 
party perceived mediation as a better option than violence. The lack of an MHS or MEO 
between the parties is largely explanatory for the failed mediation between the SPLM/A 
and GoS. 
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A. OVERVIEW 
President Bashir initiated peace talks by contacting Babangida. SPLM/A-Torit, 
SPLM/A-Nasir and the GoS attended the Abuja I Conference in Abuja. Colonel 
Muhammad al-Amin Khalifa headed the GoS delegation, Commander William Nyuon 
Bany represented the SPLM/A-Torit, and Dr. Lam Akol spoke for SPLM/A-Nasir. 
SPLM/A-Torit and SPLM/A-Nasir delegation teams merged on the sixth day of the 
conference, Bany headed the delegation, and Akol served as deputy. Dr. Tunji Olagunju, 
Nigerian Minister of Internal Affairs, was the chair of the mediation team.140   
The primary issues debated were religion and the state, national identity, the right 
of self-determination and arrangements for an interim period.141 The GoS focused on 
maintaining a unified state based on Arab and Islamic identity and refused to entertain the 
idea of self-determination or changes to the constitution that would make Sudan a secular 
state.142 The GoS delegation spoke of the historical significance of Islam in Sudan and 
blamed economic and social inequalities and conflict between the North and South on 
British colonialism. GoS representatives highlighted the importance of the Arabic 
language and Islam as unifying forces in Sudan. The GoS presented both Islam and 
Arabic as indigenous elements of Sudanese culture and maintained that Sudan’s origins 
were tied to these. It recognized the diversity of the country and presented an 
assimilationist vision of language and cultural integration, but provided no specifics on 
how it would improve the political, economic, or cultural marginalization of the South.143 
It was committed to majority rule with exceptions for minorities, but under Sharia 
law.144 
Both SPLM/A factions saw the New Sudan as a “secular, democratic, multi-
racial, multi-lingual, and multi-religious” country and rejected Islamic and Arabic 
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primacy.145 The SPLM/A delegates viewed the use of Arabic as a means to subjugate the 
South and a continued method to eliminate African customs and identities.146 SPLM/A-
Nasir regarded these differences in national identity as central to the conflict, which a 
unified state could not overcome.147 SPLM/A-Torit, however, considered the possibility 
of a unified identity in the New Sudan.148 Countering the GoS’s assertions that Sudan 
had historical roots in Islam and the Arab world, Akol stated, “south Sudan looks for its 
history within its own territory ... to its African neighbors for identity. North Sudan looks 
instead to the Arab world.”149 SPLM/A-Torit called for a secular constitution with 
specific provisions that “prohibited the recognition of any religion as a state religion.”150  
Without a constitutional change, the GoS would undoubtedly continue its 
program of Arabization and Islamization and Southern Sudan would retain an inferior 
status.151  The SPLM/A factions were split on the issue of self-determination. SPLM/A-
Torit postulated unity based on changes in the political, social, economic, and religious 
environment where all people had an equal status. If the GoS could not guarantee this 
status, then the South had the right to determine its own future (self-determine). 
SPLM/A-Nasir considered South Sudan “a separate political environment and argued that 
it should not be compelled to remain within the Sudan.”152 During Abuja I, the SPLM/A 
factions did not have similar views. This is important as it was recognized by the GoS 
that not all parties were on-board with the SPLM/A-Torit and could be exploited. 
The SPLM/A discussed a cease-fire and international monitoring, but the GoS 
rejected both ideas believing that it would undermine Sudan’s sovereignty.  The SPLM/A 
                                                 
145 Nhial Denga, Nigerian Minutes, Abuja Peace Conference, 1992,1:40 quoted in Wondu and Lesch, 
Battle for Peace, 33. 
146 Wondu and Lesch, Battle for Peace, 34. 
147 Ibid., 35. 
148 Ibid., 33. 
149 Lam Akol, Nigerian Minutes, Abuja Peace Conference, 1992, 1:48 quoted in Wondu and Lesch, 
Battle for Peace, 35. 
150 Wondu and Lesch, Battle for Peace 43. 
151 Ibid., 44. 
152 Ibid., 84. 
 40 
rebuffed the GoS stance maintaining that the GoS’s unwillingness to negotiate a cease-
fire or international monitoring proved that “the government was not negotiating 
seriously and that the armed forces were determined to defeat the SPLM/A on the 
battlefield.”153  
The mediators proposed a plan for a federal system of government to distribute 
power among the central, state, and local government. The provisions, based on the 
Nigerian system, outlined specifics for elections, provided authority for states to enact 
their own laws, expanded the number of states, and delineated a secular constitution. The 
GoS agreed in principle to the proposal but called for the central government to be the 
only law making authority and the continued use of Sharia as the legal basis for the 
constitution. The SPLM/A countered by suggesting a confederated option, which would 
give the states greater powers, and rejected a provision that would create multiple states 
within the South, endorsing a two state arrangement of North and South.154 The GoS and 
SPLM/A did not agree on identifying an interim period for a cease fire, creating political 
institutions, or beginning economic development with a referendum to follow, which 
would allow the Southern “African” population to decide on the political character of 
their region (one state or multiple states). The GoS believed the “interim period would 
merge into the permanent arrangement, without the need for a referendum ... when the 
former war zones were integrated into the current Islamic federal system;” the SPLM/A 
wanted a quick interim period believing, “a longer period might enable the central 
government to tamper with the political system.”155 
On the final night of the conference, the GoS contacted the Nigerian chair and 
demanded that the mediators delete any mention of religion from the final communiqué. 
The mediators attempted to resolve this dispute with the GoS delegation but GoS 
representatives refused to meet with the mediators. Olagunju issued and then retracted a 
threat to the GoS to end the mediation. In the end, the final communiqué did not mention 
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religion, self-determination, or referendum. The communiqué made general reference to 
issues discussed but did not specify the positions taken by either side. The communiqué 
called for the delegations to contact their party principals to clarify positions before 
negotiations resuming negotiations.156  
Thus, the first conference ended with polarized positions. In lieu of structural 
changes within the government, such as a secular constitution that guaranteed social, 
political, religious, and economic equality, the SPLM/A wanted the right of self-
determination.157 The GoS wished to maintain state unity under an Islamic and Arabic 
construct with a strong central government and worked to remove any mention of 
religion or referendum from the final communiqué; the GoS did not want to give the 
appearance that the GoS delegate would discuss either a secular state or separation of the 
South.158  Abuja I ended with each side holding firm to their original positions, and as 
Steven Wondu and Ann Lesch concluded, “the debates proved that the two sides diverged 
fundamentally on national identity and on the crucial issue of religion and the state. 
Those issues could not be papered over by vague formulae.”159 The final communiqué, 
they reported, ignored the key issues of incongruity and, “saved face for President 
Babangida and the mediating team” who had been unable to resolve party differences.160  
The Abuja II conference occurred a year later from 26 April to 18 May 1993.  The 
GoS and SPLM/A-Torit participated. The acrimonious relationship between the SPLM/A 
factions had intensified since the first conference, and SPLM/A-Torit and GoS agreed to 
mediate without the inclusion of the other SPLM/A or rebel factions.161 The GoS 
remained militarily dominant, tactically improving its gains throughout the South. The 
United States, EU and other international organizations condemned the human rights 
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atrocities occurring within Sudan and international actors pushed the Khartoum 
government to return to Nigeria to preempt further external intervention.162  
The delegates on both sides of the negotiation table differed from the previous 
year’s talks. The minister of federal government affairs, Dr. Ali al-Hag Muhammad, 
headed the GoS delegation; Commander Salva Kiir Mayardit and “highly experienced 
members, some of who had held high position in the Sudan Government’s public service 
or in academies” represented the SPLM/A163 Unlike the previous Abuja talks, the GoS 
delegation consisted of low-level representatives from the GoS; a high-level delegation 
did not arrive until the fifth day of negotiations.164  
The issues between the two sides remained unchanged from the first Abuja 
conference. The Nigerian mediators proposed “middle of the road” solutions to bridge the 
issue gap between the belligerents. These included Sharia application of “personal laws 
for marriage, cohabitation, divorce, etc. ... and similar provisions that affect family 
stability, but that all citizens would have the right to select whichever they prefer for 
personal problems.”165 Mediators proposed to remove religious references from the 
constitution and to have a “partial and gradual secularization of the legal system.”166 
Neither side, however, entertained the mediators’ ideas. When the GoS’s high-level 
delegates arrived, they were more forceful in their positions and dismissed the SPLM/A’s 
concerns over religion; the GoS delegates criticized the Nigerian mediators for making 
proposals that would undermine GoS sovereignty.167  
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The mediators appealed passionately to the parties to rise to the challenge 
and give Sudan a new lease on life ... the chair urged the delegates to be 
less ideological and more pragmatic. The parties should have the courage 
and sincerity to make meaningful compromises.168  
Though the mediators were more active, they did little to reconcile the polarized 
positions of the GoS and SPLM/A.169 The mediators called off the mediation effort “after 
three weeks of heated debates, mediation, recommendations, proposals and counter 
proposals when it became apparent they [GoS and SPLM/A] had reached a deadlock.”170 
The final communiqué described the differences between the two sides and attributed the 
failure of the Abuja II peace talks to the mediators.171  
B. ABUJA I & II ANALYSIS 
The outcome of the Abuja II talks was not surprising to the parties, mediators, or 
observers. From the beginning to the end, context factors of the conflict and mediation 
environment negatively influenced mediation outcomes and primarily determined the 
mediation’s failure. Neither party was ready or saw mediation as an opportunity to reach 
their objectives. Therein the nature of the parties significantly contributed to the failure 
while the mediators and mediation strategy had little impact. There was neither an MHS 
nor  an MEO to coerce or convince parties to negotiate peace.  
1. Nature of the Parties 
The GoS had a clear negotiating advantage in 1992 and 1993. The GOS was on 
the verge of military victory and viewed the SPLM/A as the defeated aggressors; the GoS 
viewed mediation as fruitless.172 The Khartoum regime was internally cohesive. Turabi, 
Bashir, and the NIF all sought the Arabization and Islamization of the country. GoS 
military offensives from 1991–1993, with the assistance of SPLM/A-Nasir, nearly 
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demolished the SPLM/A-Torit. During the Abuja conferences, the Khartoum regime saw 
no reason to concede to the SPLM/A demands. Mansour Khalid noted that “the 
government clearly did not go to Abuja with any intention to negotiate bona fide peace 
settlement.”173 
Throughout the Abuja conferences, the SPLM/A was at its weakest point since 
the start of the second civil war. SPLM/A was a broken political and military entity. 
SPLM/A senior leadership (Garang, versus Machar, Kong, and Akol) did not agree on 
either the goals for the conflict or how they should organize and lead the SPLM/A.174  
This resulted in the split of the SPLM/A, alliances with the GoS, and internecine fighting 
between SPLM/A-Torit and SPLM/A-Nasir. The loss of Ethiopian political and military 
support, significant military setbacks, and internal discord put the SPLM/A in a weak 
position to negotiate its demands. The schism within the SPLM/A prompted the GoS to 
demand separate SPLM/A delegations so “that he [Bashir] could play the two groups 
against each other.”175 
The parties to the Abuja mediations had completely different positions. The GoS 
was ideologically unified in its objectives and the GoS sought a single Sudan and Sharia 
law. The SPLM/A was divergent on its goals; one faction wanted outright separation, the 
other a unified state with preconditions of a secular state. Ideological differences and 
contests over power weakened the SPLM/A from within.  
Power parity between disputants favors positive mediation outcomes. Power 
inequality and asymmetry between belligerents increases the likelihood of mediation 
failure. Internal cohesion, consolidated positions, and a single representative are more 
likely to bring successful mediation outcomes. The vast disparity in military and political 
strength, SPLM/A core leadership fissures, variance in Garang and Machar’s aims, and 
the GoS’s unbreakable attitude of supremacy critically impacted the failed Abuja 
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mediations. Where the GoS was strong, the SPLM/A was weak. The conditions between 
the SPLM/A and GoS significantly influenced their perceptions of mediation and affected 
mediation outcomes.176 
2. Abuja Mediators 
Through leverage, legitimacy, and impartiality, mediators have had the power to 
influence mediation outcomes. The Nigerian mediators, however, lacked leverage and the 
disputants questioned their neutrality during the talks. During the Abuja conference, the 
Nigerian mediators had an immediate disadvantage because they lacked the power to 
influence the parties and demonstrated varied preferentialism. The nature of the mediator 
had little influence on mediation outcomes.  
The Nigerian mediation team based their legitimacy on Babangida’s position as 
president of Nigeria and chair of the OAU. Olagunju, the mediation team chair, stated 
that “Nigeria had the practical credentials for showing [the] Sudanese the way out of their 
crisis.”177 Bashir viewed the Nigerians as an “African solution” and wanted to “pre-empt 
intrusive external actors.”178 Furthermore, “NIF authorities had a belief that Nigeria 
might not agree to preside over a conference it believed could lead to a break-up of an 
OAU member state” and Babangida, as chairman of the OAU, “might not countenance 
the rebels’ call for self-determination.”179 The GoS viewed the mediators as legitimate 
because they believed that the mediation team would protect their interests. The SPLM/A 
and Garang recognized the legitimacy of the mediators primarily because it was their 
only option given the deterioration in the military situation. Collins noted that “weakened 
by disaffection and desertions, Garang had little choice but to negotiate.”180 Though the 
actors had their own reasons, each actor recognized the legitimacy of the mediator.  
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This episode demonstrates how mediators who have prestige may still be limited 
in their influence of mediation outcomes. Legitimacy and leverage are enabling 
characteristics that assist mediators. Essentially, the mediator must be the right person, 
with the right tools at the right time to affect outcomes. However, even if the mediator is 
the right person with the right tools, the timing of his or her intervention may be wrong, 
and regardless of his or her abilities or the tools available, he or she is unable to influence 
mediation conditions and outcomes. The Nigerian mediators were perceived as legitimate 
by both sides, and had the skills to conduct mediation, but the parties were not ready to 
negotiate and compromise at that time. Therefore, the mediators were not able to bridge 
the differences and create meaningful outcomes.  
Even though they had legitimacy, the mediators lacked leverage throughout the 
Abuja process. The mediators were unable to make offers, guarantees, or threats against 
the parties to garner concessions or to continue discussions when the mediation broke 
down. Mediators either altered or changed communiqués, which clearly showed their 
weakness; they based the changes on parties’ inability to “agree on the language or 
content.”181 Both sides refused mediators’ efforts to persuade or continue discussions; the 
mediation team was therefore unable to bring the parties together. The mediation team 
was weak; it was pushed around by the parties. As Lesch and Wondu noted, the 
mediators’ pleas, lobbying, appeals, and warnings, had no leverage to persuade parties to 
settle.182  Arop Madut-Arop also described the situation in bleak terns: “Whatever efforts 
the mediators exerted to salvage the talks or try to broker a cease-fire and disengagement 
of the warring factions ... the Sudan delegation would not back down.”183  
Likewise, the SPLM/A did not acquiesce to mediator lobbying. The mediation 
teams lacked the power to compel the parties to change their positions. The mediators 
were hindered from the start by belligerents who were basically unwilling to negotiate. 
Even if the mediators had more leverage, it is unlikely the belligerents would have been 
influenced by mediator threats or promises.  
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The literature review discussed different opinions regarding mediation bias and its 
effect on mediation outcomes. While mediation bias may have existed, if disputants had 
the perception that mediators dealt evenhandedly with both parties, then the likelihood of 
a settlement increased; for this reason, bias must not be so obvious that it precludes an 
agreement.184 Bias or the perception of bias alone does not bridge the gap between 
belligerents with opposing views but can facilitate the mediator as he works impartially 
for the benefit of both sides. Perceived (or actual) bias is another characteristic enables 
mediator interaction with and between disputants. Neutrality does not guarantee 
successful outcomes, but the perception that the mediator is evenhanded in his or her 
approach increases the legitimacy of the mediator and therefore could make what the 
mediator does or says more influential. Furthermore, a mediator may be entirely neutral 
but unable to affect outcomes because the parties are not ready for mediation or the 
mediator’s strategy is prohibitive to mediation success.  
Abuja mediators showed their biases to the GoS and SPLM/A, and were 
transparent in their support for one side over the other with respect to certain issues, 
which resulted in both sides’ perception of bias.185 This also undermined their ability to 
create progress in the mediation effort. Wondu and Lesch maintained that “Nigeria was a 
mediator on the question of the relationship between religion and the state and it did 
betray its preference for secularism in public law [as desired by the SPLM/A]. On the 
subject of territorial unity ... Nigeria played judge and ruled in favor of the Sudan 
government.”186  Whether or not it was intentional, the mediators directed the majority of 
their bias against the SPLM/A. In an invitation, Babangida said to Garang, “what is 
uppermost in my mind is to give Southern Sudan an opportunity for an honorable 
settlement of the crisis. This will not be possible if you are defeated on the battlefield.”187  
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The Nigerian mediators established their opinions before the conference convened and 
favored the GoS. President Babangida wanted to mediate peace but he did not want to 
break up the country during the peace process.188  
The SPLM/A was able to observe this prejudice through the conferences. Wondu 
and Lesch state that the “mediators clearly and unequivocally supported territorial unity,” 
which was a stance that the GoS favored. The GoS demanded that the mediators refrain 
from the discussing self-determination and confederalism, communiqués; this slighted the 
SPLM/A’s efforts to bring the option of a separate Southern Sudanese state to the 
forefront.189 In addition, Wondu and Lesch noted that, “the SPLM/A delegates were 
critical of the Nigerian president for his biased interference with the negotiations.”190 
While the disputants’ perceived bias was not solely responsible for the mediation 
outcome, it served as another context condition, which resulted in mediation failure 
between the GoS and SPLM/A. 
3. Mediation Strategy 
The Nigerian mediators had a limited strategy that they could employ. Their lack 
of concrete leverage meant that they could not employ a manipulative approach. The 
mediators used both facilitative and formulative strategies throughout the Abuja 
conferences. In a facilitative role, the mediators provided a neutral location for the peace 
talks and allowed the SPLM/A and GoS to present their positions through discussions 
and debate. Wondu and Lesch noted that the talks “provided a unique platform to expose 
the causes of the conflict and solutions that the Sudanese thought were possible ... to 
appreciate and appraise each other’s views, feelings, perceptions and aspirations.”191 
Madut-Arop wrote that the “Nigerian-sponsored peace talks was the first time ... that both  
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sides have come out explicitly with what each of the parties considered the best way out 
of war” and Khalid noted that, “the Abjua process put the question of national identity in 
the center of the debate.”192  
The mediators also took a formulative approach demonstrated by their 
presentations and proposals on the distribution of power, wealth sharing, religion, and the 
state. The polarized position of the parties stymied these efforts because neither side was 
willing to incorporate new positions. The mediator strategy had little bearing on the 
Abuja mediation outcomes.  
4. Ripeness 
Mediation ripeness occurs when belligerents perceive nonviolent conflict 
settlement methods more beneficial that a continuation of violence. This perception is 
based on the threat that violence will hurt instead of help the belligerents’ cause (MHS) 
or that mediation offers better opportunities to achieve goals (MEO). Belligerents 
perceive the time is right to forgo violence and seek peace through alternative methods. 
Mediators can cultivate ripeness by providing incentives (positive or negative) that 
influence a MHS or MEO. Conflict ripeness for mediation depended on the fusion of 
parties’ readiness for mediation (whether it be a MHS or MEO); the presence, readiness, 
and resources of a capable mediator, and a strategy that would support party interests and 
bring them together.  
In the Abuja I and II peace talks, neither MEO nor MHS was evident for either 
party. The contributing factors that brought parties to negotiation and engendered 
successful mediation were missing at the Abuja conferences. The GoS was strategically 
and tactically dominant militarily; the SPLM/A suffered the greatest amount of pain in 
the history of the conflict. The GoS had no reason to enter into mediation except to 
entertain the international community’s desires to participate. The SPLM/A had little 
option but to join during its military malaise and hope that something positive would 
come from the mediations. The mediators lacked resources to influence the parties, which 
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resulted in a circumscribed strategy to gain concessions. Ripeness was not present 
because neither party viewed mediation as the best option to reach their objectives. The 
mediators did not have the ability to influence the SPLM/A or the GoS because it had no 
positive or negative, tangible or intangible means to adjust the opinions of the parties. 
However, based on the nature of the belligerents, it is unlikely that the mediators would 
have been able to change GoS or SPLM/A positions for an agreement.   
C. CONCLUSION 
The conference was successful in illuminating the issues important to each 
side.193 The fundamental differences, however, were a wedge that the Abuja conferences 
could not dislodge. At the end of the talks, each side knew the positions of their enemy, 
but contrary to the mediators’ aspirations fighting increased following the end of the 
second conference. Lesch wrote that “the negotiations illustrated the pitfalls of 
negotiating in a polarized political context, in which talks heightened mistrust rather than 
bridge differences.”194 The lack of ripeness for mediation played a significant role in the 
Abuja peace conferences’ outcomes and was the determining factor of mediation failure. 
This lack of ripeness was based primarily on the nature of the parties. Mediator attributes 
and strategy also contributed to failed outcome but those factors were overshadowed by 
the intractable relationship between the parties at the time.  
The belligerents during the Abuja mediation process were not ready for 
mediation. Within the GoS, Turabi and Bashir guided the party toward a strict goal of 
Arabization and Islamization. The NIF maintained socio-political, military, and cultural 
control over influential sectors of the country. The coup d’état that brought Bashir (and 
Turabi) to power came with a string of military victories, which galvanized the NIF’s 
mission to spread Islam throughout the state and, by extension, obligated continued 
conflict against the SPLM/A who sought to undermine their existence by creating a 
separate state. The GoS held a decided advantage at the mediation and neither the 
SPLM/A or the mediators could do little to appease their demands. The mediation was 
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simply a means to an end for Bashir, Turabi, and the NIF. The outcome was a failure, 
because there was little chance that the GoS was going to rescind its demands and adhere 
to the desires of either the mediators or the SPLM/A. There was no incentive for the GoS 
to negotiate.  
The SPLM/A also maintained a hardline position, fearful that relenting to any 
demands on substantive issues (self-determination, religion, state, and federalism) would 
result in their continued marginalization. Though the SPLM/A negotiated from a fragile 
position they refused to betray their ideological principles for a New Sudan. The 
SPLM/A was willing to fight to the death if they could not achieve change through 
mediation. The SPLM/A had to be unfaltering and uncompromising on its views if it was 
to achieve equality within the Sudan or existence as a separate state.   
The nature of the mediator had a minimal effect on the Abuja conference 
outcomes. One could argue that had the mediator been more powerful, the Nigerians 
could have coerced or cajoled more agreements from the parties. This is unlikely as 
neither party was compelled to alter their positions. The parties’ aversion to negotiate 
could not be overcome by the legitimacy or leverage of the mediators.  The deficiency of 
financial, political, or military resources to influence the mediation outcomes certainly 
curtailed mediator strategy but was not the reason for the Abuja failures.  
A mediator can have varying influence on each party and as noted earlier, is a 
conditional input to the contextual circumstances. If he or she arrives with the right tools 
but does so at the wrong time, he or she is likely to be ineffectual. Mediator guarantees 
for protections might have worked with the SPLM/A because it was in dire military and 
political straits, but changing the GoS’s outlook would have been impossible, given its 
belief that its military triumphs would soon remove any SPLM/A threat and that its sound 
political standing could not be usurped. This analysis held for any carrots or sticks that 
mediators offered to the parties.  
While the mediation effort was unsuccessful in reducing violence and ending the 
conflict, it did enable the parties to identify their differences. The facilitative strategy was 
effective in that it resulted in an understanding of the belligerents’ viewpoints and 
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objectives. This would prove helpful in later rounds of mediation, but further separated 
the belligerents during the Abuja conferences.  
Yet, in terms of ending violence the formulative approach did little to bring the 
parties to a compromise. As was noted, the SPLM/A and GoS rejected different mediator 
solutions. While the mediators attempted to mold their strategies to the temperament of 
the parties they were limited in how they could operate because they did not have the 
leverage to use a more forceful strategy. It is unlikely that if the mediators attempted 
forceful coercion or offered guarantees to the belligerents that the parties would have 
changed their positions. The relationship between the parties was not conducive for 
mediation and timing of the mediation inopportune. Because of the conflict was not ripe 
for mediation, the nature of the mediator and the strategy employed was negligible in 
affecting the Abuja mediation outcomes.  
The mediation outcomes of the Abuja conference were primarily as result of bad 
timing. The conditions of an MEO or MHS that result in successful mediation were not 
present to produce a peace settlement. At the time of the Abuja conferences, no mediator 
or mediation strategy would have changed the outcomes. The cavity between the 
demands of the SPLM/A and GoS was too expansive and neither party viewed mediation 
as a viable option.  The parties were simply not prepared to negotiate for peace. 
Mediation outcomes of Abuja were the result of an unripe period created by the uneven 
and highly volatile relationship between the parties. Mediation outcomes were further, 
but less affected by the mediators attributes and the strategy employed. A more 
appropriate time for third-party intervention would have to arrive before mediation 




IV. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY FOR 
DEVELOPMENT PEACE INITIATIVE 1994–2001 
The IGAD I peace talks were complicated with a number of the same issues that 
had also vexed the Abuja peace process. The GoS remained vigilant in its desire for a 
Sudanese state with Sharia and a Muslim-Arab national identity; the SPLM/A remained 
stalwart in the option to self-determine the political future of the southern region.  This 
period of mediation effort witnessed a brief moment of ripeness when the GoS agreed to 
the Declaration of Principles (DoP) during the latter stages of IGAD I but the majority of 
the time, neither party perceived either a MEO, MHS or were ready use mediation in 
place of violence to reach their aims. At the start of IGAD there remained a power 
imbalance between the SPLM/A and GoS. However, during the latter part of the IGAD I 
mediation process there was a change in the internal dynamics of both parties and a shift 
in the power dynamics between the belligerents. Like the Abuja process, IGAD mediators 
used primarily facilitative and formulative strategies, and their success was limited, 
partially due to their own weakness. While the IGAD mediators continued to lack 
leverage and the legitimacy of the mediators waffled, the perception of bias turned in 
favor of the SPLM/A. The overall outcome of the IGAD I mediation process was a 
failure but a significant document was signed by both parties in toward the end of the 
decade that would had an impact on future mediation between the SPLM/A and GoS. On 
the whole, the conflict parameters remained constant from the Abuja peace initiative and 
the conflict remained unripe for resolution. Therefore, just as in Abuja, the outcomes of 
the IGAD I peace process were again attributable to the lack of ripeness, party 
intransigence, a not sufficiently capable and biased mediator and limited mediation 
strategy.  
IGAD I peace initiatives took place over a six-year period in two phases. The first 
phase occurred from January-September 1994; the second phase happened from July 
1997 to June 2001. Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi chaired the IGAD Standing 
Committee; Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia), Isaias Afewerki (Eritrea), and Yoweri Museveni 
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(Uganda) were the other members.195 A ministerial committee representing the four 
states conducted the mediation in Nairobi, Kenya, and Kenyan foreign minister, Kalonzo 
Musyoka, served as the chairman.196 Throughout the period, the political and military 
conditions that favored the SPLM/A or GoS vacillated between the parties. A military 
resurgence, external support, and alliances with other rebel groups, gave the SPLM/A 
equal footing in the negotiations during the later 1990s. While rifts within the NIF and 
battlefield losses weakened the GoS, the peace deals it made with disaffected SPLM/A 
factions bolstered the GoS position.197 The mediators remained relatively ineffectual; the 
disputants’ perception that the mediators were biased limited the mediators’ leverage and 
rendered them incapable of ending the violent conflict between the SPLM/A and the 
GoS.  
A. OVERVIEW  
The IGAD standing committee initiated consultations with the GoS, SPLM/A-
Mainstream, and SPLM/A-United in January 1994. The first phase of talks occurred in 
March 1994 and continued in May, July, and September of the same year.198 During 
consultations, Garang spoke for SPLM/A-Mainstream and Machar represented SPLM-
United. The SPLM/A factions agreed on three issues for negotiation: self-determination 
through referendum to be conducted in Southern Sudan, interim arrangements for the 
transitional period, and a cease-fire to allow humanitarian relief efforts.199 While the GoS 
agreed to negotiate, they were hesitant to discuss a ceasefire or self-determination as 
separate items on the agenda.200 
                                                 
195 Khalid, War and Peace in Sudan, 369.  
196 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan, 104. 
197 See Appendix II for peace deals between the GoS and rebel groups.  
198 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan, 104–106. 
199 Ibid, 104–105; SPLM/A-Nasir was the rebel group that was formed by Riek Machar, Gordon 
Kong, and Lam Akol after their defection from SPLA/M-Mainstream in 1991. SPLM/A-Nasir changed its 
name to SPLM/A-United in 1993. SPLM/A-Torit became SPLM/A-Mainstream. Wondu and Lesch, Battle 
for Peace, 153. 
200 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan, 105. 
 55 
At the first round of talks in March 1994, Richard Mulla represented the 
SPLM/A-Nasir and Salva Kiir Mayardrit led the SPLM/A-Mainstream delegation.201 The 
mediators proposed a “compromise agenda to negotiate cease-fire, then agree on the 
constitutional principles that would guide the resolution of civil war, and finally make the 
necessary political and security arrangements for the interim period.”202 Dr. Ali al Hajj 
Mohamed, GoS delegation lead, rejected the agenda and threatened to walk out if the 
mediators mentioned self-determination.203 Though Machar and Garang agreed on self-
determination during the January 1994 consultations, SPLM/A-United re-positioned itself 
with the GoS when the mediators addressed the issue during the March 1994 talks.204 
The parties failed to reach an agreement on substantive issues that would invite peace, 
but both sides agreed to allow international observers and to open air and land routes to 
facilitate humanitarian efforts.205 Once again, the SPLM/A did not have consolidated 
positions. 
The second meeting under IGAD mediation occurred in May 1994. Mediation 
team chair, Kalanzo Musyoka, began the meeting with a plea to both sides to take the 
effort seriously and show sensitivity toward each other.206 The meeting lacked any 
substantial discussion of the issues and each side presented the same position that they 
had voiced during the March meeting.207 In response, the mediation team changed 
tactics, moving from a facilitative to a formulative strategy. To attempt to move the 
parties into a concrete negotiation phase, the IGAD mediation team unexpectedly 
presented the parties with a concrete set of proposals, contained in the DoP.208 The DoP 
stipulated the right of the South to self-determine, but placed emphasis on the unity of the 
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state. It called for “priority to be given to unity on the basis of agreement on a secular, 
pluralist democratic polity that would undertake to respect human rights and to 
decentralize administration.”209 The DoP addressed the SPLM/A’s desires and they “fully 
endorsed the document as a basis for the future negotiations with the Khartoum Regime.” 
The GoS, however, was adamant in its rejection, and instead argued that they had no 
option but to pursue military victory.210 The second conference ended without an 
agreement on substantive issues and showed the divergent views between the DoP and 
the mediators; the GoS “was ‘enraged’ and accused the mediators of bias.”211 Because it 
still viewed military force as a viable option, rather than continuing to negotiate, the 
government resumed its military operations. In contrast, SPLM/A officials found the DoP 
“even-handed” and a “pleasant surprise.”212 The SPLM/A continued to negotiate from a 
weaker position and the DoP outlined their objectives in the civil war. The perception 
was not the same on the GoS side.  
The third round of IGAD talks in July 1994 brought about similar arguments and 
debates from each side. President Moi asked for a cease-fire and requested that both 
parties submit responses to the DoP.213 The GoS was staunchly against wording in the 
DoP that would allow a Southern referendum for self-determination under conditions of 
continued inequality and marginalization. Chief delegate al Khalifa voiced his 
discontentment when he warned that “if you (IGAD) want to separate the South from the 
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North, it will be done through the barrel of the gun.”214 The government evoked Sudan’s 
sovereignty and stated that the issues of “religion and state and self-determination and 
secession of the south were outside the IGAD’s scope.”215 The government did make 
concessions with respect to the DoP’s wording, which allowed the South to determine 
their future through referendum but members of the government delegation who agreed 
to the changes were chastised when they returned to Khartoum.216 To the GoS self-
determination and secularism were non-negotiable.217 The parties agreed to a cease-fire 
although Garang feared that the government would continue its attacks without 
international monitors present.218 The fundamental issues between the GoS and SPLM/A 
remained contested. The importance of the internal cohesion and nature of the parties is 
demonstrated here as a critical factor of mediation outcomes. When delegates of the GoS 
undermined the stance of the regime, they were punished for making concessions. The 
party needed to remain whole in its approach and not give in to any demands of the 
SPLM/A. The GoS perceived no benefit from mediation and was not ready to negotiate a 
peace settlement.  
Though the third mediation round did not completely end violence with a peace 
agreement, the pact that was signed demonstrated that the two sides could agree on minor 
points. Peace remained a long way off but a step was taken in the right direction. The 
Abuja mediations had helped the parties to identify their core issues and to communicate 
those to the opposite side, while the IGAD mediators fostered agreement on limited 
compromises in non-central issue areas. This was a partial success, as it began to change 
the relationship dynamic between the parties.  It did not end or even contain violence, 
however, so does not qualify as a “success” in the sense utilized in this thesis.  
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In the final IGAD conference in September 1994, Khartoum appeared even more 
belligerent than in previous sessions. Bashir sent Ghazi Salah al-Din Atabani and Nafie 
Ali Nafie, both hardline Islamists, as part of a completely white Arab government 
delegation.219 Commenting on war with the South, Salah Atabani remarked, “the 
problem in the Southern Sudan was bred and nurtured by the British Colonialist ... my 
government’s duty is to Islamise [sic] the whole of Africa since that task had been 
interrupted by the European Colonialism.”220 These comments flabbergasted conference 
attendees and effectively ended the fourth session before it ever began.221 Atabani 
stressed that a “cease-fire would be addressed once unity was ensured by force.”222 The 
government sought to refocus its position and undermine the concessions made by its 
delegation in the previous round. This last session during September 1994 demonstrated 
the GoS absolute unwillingness to compromise. The time was not ripe to mediate with 
the SPLM/A and GoS.  
The delegation’s firm stance was based on top Sudanese government officials’ 
beliefs. Bashir and Turabi both met individually with President Moi before the 
conference and expressed their desires that the GOS would not waver on its demand for 
an Islamic law in Sudan.223 Bashir diplomatically supported the DoP document but 
considered the deadlock on key issues a non-starter for the fourth conference.224  
Musyoka ended the talks before the SPLM/A made opening remarks. President Moi 
recognized the lack of progress and called a meeting to brief IGAD heads of state on the 
stalled peace talks in attempt to persuade Khartoum to accept the DoP, but ultimately the 
talk did not move forward.225 The first IGAD peace initiative ended in Nairobi after the 
September 1994 talks. The SPLM/A and IGAD waited three years until the GoS returned 
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to the negotiating table.226 The mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and mutually enticing 
opportunity (MEO) depend on a mutual perception by the parties that victory is 
unachievable or an opportunity exists through mediation that is unavailable with 
continued violence. During the 1994 IGAD talks, neither of these conditions was 
perceived by the GoS. While the SPLM/A viewed mediation as a possible option, that 
opinion was not shared by its enemies.  
IGAD talks resumed in Nairobi in July 1997. Both international and domestic 
factors brought the GoS back to Nairobi. Although the GoS made many attempts during 
the break to locate a different mediator, including South Africa, Malaysia, the World 
Council of Churches, they failed to find a willing referee to take the IGAD’s place.227 
Sudan’s neighbors cancelled diplomatic ties “citing Khartoum’s destabilizing policies” 
within the region.228 Eritrea and Uganda and did so in December 1994 and April 1995, 
respectively. Ethiopian relations “deteriorated following allegations of Khartoum’s 
complicity in the Hosni Mubarak assassination attempt.”229 Following the 1994 
mediation failure, the tide began to further shift against the Sudanese government as it 
was increasingly looked down upon in the international community as international 
actors recognized the plight of the SPLM/A. External pressures (discussed later) pushed 
the GoS to return to the negotiating table if only for a brief period. The military power 
balance had shifted in the SPLM/A’s favor (due in large part to international assistance) 
and the failure of GoS to at least appear to support a peace initiative could bring further 
international action against the country, therein threatening the power of the regime.  
During the three-year break, the political, military, and asymmetric power balance 
between the GoS and SPLM/A shifted significantly to favor the SPLM/A. The 
Chukudum Accord between the Umma and SPLM/A recognized the right of the South to 
separate and determine by “free choice,” not force, the status (independent or unified) of 
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the South.230 The Asmara Declaration between the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
and SPLM/A created a political and militarily capable challenger to the NIF and further 
established the right of the South to hold a referendum on secession.231 With the NDA 
alliance, “the status of politicians inside the Sudan was increasingly at risk” by 
heightening political, social, and military pressure on the Khartoum regime.232 The 
strengthened military position of the SPLM/A in the fall of 1995 and spring of 1997 
resulted in military campaigns that recaptured strategic villages and defeated government 
forces throughout the southern region.233 The power shift between the SPLM/A and GoS 
briefly changed conflict dynamics between the belligerents, and in combination with 
external factors, pushed the parties back to mediation.  
The GoS returned to Nairobi for several reasons: UN pressure after alleged 
Sudanese government involvement in the assassination attempt of Egyptian President 
Mubarak (1995), harboring of international terrorists, and continued human rights abuses 
subjected the regime to international action against it, and earned it the moniker of being 
a “rogue regime.” Similarly, United States’ non-lethal military support through the 
frontline strategy increased SPLM/A military victories and capabilities and depleted GoS 
forces. Furthermore, increased IPF involvement meant that the international community 
was more serious about finding a peaceful solution to the second Sudan civil war. 234 The 
IPF took greater interest in the mediation process beginning in 1994 but did not provide 
funding or support until 1997.235 Wondu and Lesch noted that “Khartoum feared that 
international actors had “presaged direct international action ... the government needed to 
appear to be making progress in search for peace.”236 There remained a perception that 
the military situation was still the optimal solution, but the GoS recognized it could no 
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longer ignore the building international attention. The government needed to do 
something to relieve the pressure it faced internally and externally. While it bided its time 
to attempt to regain the military upper hand, it agreed to engage in additional rounds of 
mediation with the SPLM/A. 
During the July 1997 talks, the GoS accepted and signed the DoP. The GoP 
agreed to the DoP as a framework to end the civil war but maintained the right to reject 
individual principles.237 The GoS accepted the right of self-determination through 
referendum but continued to hold a hard line on Sharia and a federal government 
throughout the interim period.238 Khalid noted that 1997 saw divisions within the NIF 
regime, “while the cabinet supported the peace initiative because of the reversals on the 
battlefield after a string of victories by the SPLM/A, the zealots ... wanted nothing but 
war.”239 Though only a brief window in the IGAD peace process, the GoS’s signature of 
the DoP was a significant step toward establishing a baseline of issues and objectives for 
future negotiations between the SPLM/A and GoS.240 A ripe moment had finally arrived 
as a result of both internal and external pressures. The mediators were able to persuade 
the GoS to agree to a significant framework that would be the basis of future negotiations 
between the belligerents. However, context of the relationship between the parties would 
change within a few months and the hardline position of the NIF and GoS returned 
ending this period of ripeness before more concrete changes could be made.  
Mediators held another session in October 1997 and sought to move forward in 
light of the GoS’s concession, attempting to force negotiations on the details. The 
mediators made little additional progress toward curtailing the conflict, however.241 
While the GoS had made concessions, each party left the talks bitter. The GoS accused 
the SPLM/A of “separatist extremism” and the other parties accused the GoS of 
“intransigence, hegemonic designs, and trying to end armed resistance by a promise of 
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self-determination that Khartoum had no intention of honoring.”242 Following the 
conference, Garang stated that “[w]e intended not to reach an agreement with the 
[Sudanese government]. This is what we did and we succeeded in it because we did not 
reach an agreement.”243  
The ripe moment was lost and mediator efforts to forward progress halted by 
SPLM/A and GoS unwillingness to make further concessions. With military victories, the 
SPLM/A had been the more obstinate belligerent party, but once the GoS once again 
gained the upper hand, it withdrew its support for the mediation effort. The GoS had 
satisfied the international community by agreeing to the DoP, which bought it time to 
return to the military option to defeat the SPLM/A. The mediators were successful in 
bringing a compromise between the parties when both parties were ready to do so., but 
only so long as they remained in this stalemate.244 The international pressure was enough 
to push the GoS to the negotiating table and initiate concessions during a period of 
regime uncertainty but was not enough to force a peace settlement. Further international 
and domestic pressures and changes in the party dynamics of the SPLM/A and GoS were 
needed produce a moment ripe for mediation and alter mediation outcomes.   
In January 1998, the GoS successfully conducted military attacks against the 
SPLM/A. The next IGAD meetings occurred in May and August 1998, but again the 
parties made little progress. Throughout these meetings discussions became deadlocked 
by each side restating their positions and making accusations that the other party was 
attempting to undermine the peace process.245  Abdelwahab El-Affendi stated that the 
“positions of the parties continued to diverge on several major points: areas where the 
referendum should take place, the interim period, interim arrangements, and on religion 
and the state.”246 This did not change over the next three years. The later years of the 
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IGAD I peace talks would remain unripe for mediation. The mediation outcomes would 
not change considerably until both parties perceived that third-party intervention offered 
the best solution to the civil war.  
IGAD mediation talks occurred a number of times between July 1999 and 
September 2000. Throughout this period, neither party changed its stance on the major 
issues. Another meeting in January 2000 failed and resulted in a similar stalemate 
between the two sides; a meeting in May 2000 “failed to materialize as the SPLM/A 
refused to attend in protest at government bombing of civilian targets.”247   
The government boycotted the next meeting at the end of the summer claiming 
that the SPLM/A violated the cease-fire agreement of Bahr al-Ghazal. Talks resumed in 
September 2000. The mediators proposed a new secular framework to allow individual 
states to implement individual religious legislation; the government demanded the 
mention of Sharia if it agreed, but the mediators made no changes to the proposal. The 
mediators introduced wealth sharing to the meeting, but the principal parties engaged in 
little dialogue on the issue. Another meeting was proposed for October 2000 but never 
materialized. The SPLM/A launched a major offensive the day before IGAD talks in June 
2001 and declared to the conference that “the SPLM/A has the power to meet force with 
force.”248 The GoS called for a cease-fire but the SPLM/A ignored the call to end 
violence and the talks ended after one day. The SPLM/A was reluctant to give up its 
military advantage because that gave the GoS unfettered access to oil wealth; the GoS 
wanted a cease-fire to ensure the same.   The SPLM/A was concerned with the export oil 
that enabled the GoS to purchase weapons material in order to increase their war effort. 
The fighting in the South moved toward the oil rich regions where the SPLM/A attacked 
infrastructure to decrease the GoS’s new revenue stream.249 Collins pointed out that  
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“despite their ethnic and internecine struggles, the southerners were adamantly opposed 
to the exploitation of southern oil by foreigners for the benefit of northern Sudanese 
Arabs.”250 
B. IGAD I ANALYSIS 
Similar to the Abuja conferences, the outcome of the first IGAD peace initiative 
was not unsurprising. Except for a brief window when the GoS adopted the DoP the 
context conditions crippled IGAD mediation efforts. The intransigence of both parties, 
weakness and bias of the mediator, and a lack of ripeness explained the failed outcomes 
of the IGAD peace initiative during the 1990s.  
1. Nature of the Parties 
The first IGAD peace initiative came a year following the demise of the Abuja 
talks. The parties exhibited little change in terms of their nature following the end of 
Abuja to the IGAD. In 1994, the GoS had a clear military and political advantage. 
Khartoum maintained a viewpoint that the SPLM/A was on its way to defeat and 
negotiations would be fruitless especially since the government was going to win 
militarily and subdue the SLPM/A. Madut-Arop wrote, “Confident that the rebellion 
would soon be over, President Bashir did not have any reason to worry any longer about 
war and peace issues but only to attend to his government’s vital policies at home and 
abroad.”251 The NIF remained internally united in its approach toward mediation. Peter 
A. Nyaba wrote that the IGAD Peace Initiative came about when the “National Islamic 
Front government, assured of militarily defeating the SPLM/A, wanted now to isolate it 
diplomatically.”252 Bashir’s pronouncements demonstrated complete confidence in the 
GoS military capability to ruin the SPLM/A, and therefore undermine any diplomatic 
attempt to secure peace.  
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The SPLM/A remained politically and militarily weakened during the first phase 
of IGAD negotiations in 1994. The failure of the SPLM/A leadership to agree to the 
future status of the Sudan bolstered the GoS position on the battlefield and in mediation. 
Within its ranks, the SPLM/A was unable to maintain solidarity, and during mediation, 
unable to present a united front. The Nuba Mountains Agreement between the SPLM/A-
United and GoS in April 1994 put Garang and the SPLM/A-Mainstream in an awkward 
position; Garang’s former allies brokered peace and he was alone in facing the GoS. 
Power disparity remained between the SPLM/A and GoS. During the 1994 
mediation, the GoS had little reason to change its position during mediation. The GoS 
was still politically cohesive and militarily successful. It promoted Islamization and 
Arabization throughout the country and disregarded the desires of the IGAD mediators 
and the SPLM/A. Militarily bent to the breaking point and politically disjointed, the 
SPLM/A remained on the other end of the spectrum. The SPLM/A had ambiguous 
political desires, which made it incapable of negotiating with strength.253 
Leading up to 1997, the domestic and international dynamics against the GoS 
increased pressure to reengage mediation. Bashir and the NIF felt challenged by from the 
SPLM/A-NDA alliance.254  As noted earlier, the SPLM/A-NDA alliance presented a 
political and military threat NIF power and state control. The threat of rebel groups was 
no longer distinct between the North and South but formed a consolidated position 
against the government that not only physically increased the challenge against the NIF 
regime, but established a social, political, and psychological opponent capable of 
undermining NIF rule. Where the SPLM/A slowly began to come together, the GoS 
increasingly faced disarray. Turabi’s misdeals in foreign policy and his disappointment in 
the domestic campaign soured relations with Bashir.255 Bashir took the brunt of the 
international community’s outrage over Turabi’s associations with Osama bin-Laden and 
GoS’s involvement in the Mubarak assassination attempt. Foreign intervention, would 
                                                 
253 The Search for Peace in the Sudan: A Chronology of Sudanese Peace Processes 1989–2001 
(London: European Sudanese Public Affairs Council, 2002), 4. 
254 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 209. 
255 Young, The Fate of Sudan, 39. 
 66 
usurp Bashir who was officially in charge of the state, not Turabi who worked in the 
shadows. Throughout the late 1990s, Bashir needed to attend to both international and 
domestic pressures that threatened his power. The domestic threats came from inside the 
party (Turabi) and outside the party (SPLM/A). Before Bashir could address the threat 
from the SPLM/A he had to ensure his house was in order and threats to his power were 
eliminated. As noted earlier in the comparison of the parties, the influence of Islam as a 
guiding ideology for the NIF changed to a more secular focus. Bashir made a strategic 
decision to remove Turabi and consolidate his NCP with a less ideological focused effort. 
Natsios wrote, “by the end of the 1990s, Turabi’s vision for an Islamist revolution 
had failed. His Islamist cadres had been absorbed into the power structure of a Bashir 
government that was more intent on survival ... Bashir’s breach with Turabi had also 
eroded the government’s already weak base of popular support.”256  Madut-Arop stated 
that, “Instead of working together for consolidating power in order to resist all the forces 
both national and international that were working to put it [NIF] out of existence, NIF 
leadership split into two hostile camps each threatening to do away with each other.”257 It 
was “Turabi, who insisted that the defeat of the SPLM/A was essential for the spread and 
consolidation of Islam in Sudan.”258 President Meles Zenawi argued that, “ideologically 
and politically, the form of fundamentalism that was ascendant from 1989 to 1996 in 
Khartoum is defeated. However, Islamic values are still there, and will be a political 
factor for a long time. But the virulent, messianic, export-oriented Islamism has dwindled 
in significance and has become inward looking.”259 The once strong NIF was riddled 
with internal dissention that threatened the power of elites.  
The conglomeration of political parties, both secular and religious, and increased 
coordination among rebel groups from the North and South, threatened to undo NIF’s 
political control and dominance that the party maintained within the country. SPLM/A 
military victories over the previous three years reduced the tactical strength of the GoS, 
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while internal disarray and external influences from neighbors and international 
organization required that the Khartoum regime acquiesce on some of the terms (self-
determination), if only to temporarily appease mediators and onlookers.  
In 1997, SPLM/A defeated GoS forces in a number of battles throughout the 
South.260 While it had lost training sites and political support from Ethiopia in 1991, the 
assistance of Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya and the United States (through the Frontline 
Strategy) provided the SPLM/A with tactical and strategic advantages.261 The SPLM/A 
improved its political position and negotiating strength through alliances with the Umma 
party and NDA with the Asmara and Chukudum Agreements. Internally, the rebel 
alliance was now more cohesive; Northern political parties and rebel groups joined with 
the SPLM/A of the South.262 The rebels agreed that the South should have the right to 
secede through referendum. Though this was not ideal for John Garang, he agreed to the 
idea, tacitly, if only to bring greater support to the Southern cause.  
From 1994–1997 the dynamic between the SPLM/A and GoS changed. In 1994, 
the relationship between the SPLM/A and the GoS was asymmetric; the GoS maintained 
a political, economic, tactical, and strategic advantage over the SPLM/A. With 
agreements among rebel forces, external assistance, and military victories the balance of 
power between the parties changed to favor the SPLM/A. In the latter phases of the first 
IGAD peace initiative, power parity shifted to favor the SPLM/A rather than the GoS, but 
by the end of IGAD I, there was a symmetric balance between the two belligerents. When 
the SPLM/A was at its strongest point, the GoS capitulated and agreed to the DoP, but the 
subsequent restoration of power equilibrium between the two actors saw deadlock return 
to the mediation table.  
IGAD I mediation outcomes came to a recognizable conclusion because both 
parties did not perceive mediation to be beneficial to their cause (neither readiness, MHS, 
MEO, nor optimism was present with both parties). In the earlier sessions of 1994, the 
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lack of mediation ripeness was considerably influenced by the nature of the parties. The 
continued internal cohesiveness of the NIF and asymmetry on the battlefield allowed 
them to be staunch in their objections to SPLM/A demands and mediator proposals. 
SPLM/A’s internal disorganization and its failures on the battlefield undercut their 
strength, which forced GoS concessions. The imbalance between the GoS and SPLM/A 
did not favor successful mediation outcomes in 1994.  
The mediation outcomes from 1997-2001 changed little but a period of NIF 
weakness resulted in signature of the DoP. External and internal political pressures and 
military losses caused the GoS to bend in its position temporarily, but when parity 
between the military forces resumed, the GoS returned to a uncompromising negotiating 
position. On the other hand, SPLMA/A military victories and political agreements and 
perceived international support for its cause from the mid- to late 1990s emboldened the 
SPLM/A in its belief that it could win militarily against the GoS. In the later years of 
IGAD I mediation, the relationship between the parties resulted in more forceful 
positions or abandonment of the peace talks. The nature of the parties caused a lack of 
mediation ripeness and was a critical factor in determining mediation outcomes of the 
first IGAD round of Sudan civil war peace talks.  
2. IGAD Mediators 
As was the case with the Nigerian mediators, the lack of resources hindered 
IGAD mediators in 1994 and 1997–2000. The IGAD mediators began with legitimacy 
but this changed during the sessions with a perceived bias toward the GoS. IGAD looked 
like a good mechanism to mediate, but their clear impartiality and inability to sway the 
SPLM/A and GoS proved instrumental in the failed mediation outcomes.   
The IGAD mediators had the trust of the SPLM/A and the GoS when the peace 
process began in 1994. The trust was whittled away by mediator actions during the IGAD 
talks.263 Bashir requested IGAD mediation and the IGAD had obliged. The SPLM/A 
“eventually accepted to participate in deference to the African heads of State 
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involved.”264 Khalid noted that the IGAD showed promise because “it brought together a 
high-powered team of mediators, heads of state three whom had experience in armed 
struggle and revolutionary politics ... and they [Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda] were 
genuinely committed to finding a lasting solution to the long-drawn conflict.”265 Young 
identified that from GoS’s point of view, IGAD was the “only group that could convince 
the SPLM/A to accept peace” and that the “GoS could not say no to an African 
initiative.”266 Bashir spoke highly about IGAD in public, but the NIF had other designs 
for the peace conferences; for example, “NIF strategists had believed that the IGAD 
countries, because of their internal political difficulties, could not take a firm stand on 
peace talks. For the NIF regime, the purpose of these talks was to isolate the SPLM/A 
diplomatically while preparing the ground to destroy it militarily.”267 
The GoS wrongly assumed that the IGAD countries would not be able to take a 
firm stance. IGAD did take a firm stance, but it was against the GoS, which was the result 
of the relationship between Sudan and other IGAD states. Young observed that a 
“weakness of the IGAD peace process was attributable to tensions between the countries 
of the region.”268 Mediator countries’ military action against the GoS undermined the 
neutral position of the mediators. The leaders of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea used 
armed force against rebels in their countries (and against GoS forces) but told Sudan that 
it should broker peace with its rebels.269 Khartoum’s expected that the IGAD mediation 
would help them, but conditions within the region between the mediators and the GoS 
resulted in a bias against the GoS.  
Mediators engaged in mediation activities often with their own objectives.270 
IGAD’s objective was to “integrate and contain Khartoum in the interests of regional 
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stability.”271 Regional partners feared that the civil war would push over the borders.272 
The GoS and outsiders recognized this partiality when a U.S. Institute for Peace report 
noted that, “three of IGAD’s member states have pushed for the ouster of the NIF 
government in Khartoum and expected the government to fall soon. They emphasized 
putting military pressure on Khartoum.”273 The mediators’ introduction of the DoP 
demonstrated favoritism for the SPLM/A and a temporary “redressing the balance in 
favor of the rebels.”274 While the SPLM/A was pleased with IGAD, the GoS considered 
the prejudice a threat to their cause, which led them to search for a different mediator. 
IGAD mediator influence was reduced by a lack of leverage, legitimacy, and 
neutrality which further influenced of the mediation outcomes. El-Affendi argued that 
“with IGAD’s severely limited capacity and the self-imposed rigidities it labored under, 
any progress would have been nothing short of a miracle ... the regional set-up, which 
lacked the capacity to promote peace, proved also too fragile to pursue forceful 
intervention.”275  Among the stumbling blocks Adar  identified were a “lack of resources, 
capacity to implement programs, transparency and co-ordination ... and instability within 
the region.”276 Lesch  described a situation where mediators  never gained credibility: 
“IGAD mediators’ views were distinctly more favorable to the SPLM/A than to 
Khartoum. Moreover, they lacked the mechanism for carrying out their proposed 
solutions.”277 
Questionable legitimacy, demonstrating a clear bias, and undermining in lieu of 
leverage, IGAD mediators operated in a confused environment, with unclear objectives 
or purpose. El-Affendi wrote that the mediators did little to prepare for the new round of  
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talks [in 1997] and “relied mainly on improvisation, and were singularly unable to 
structure the talks to avoid sliding into the usual deadlock; it was not at all clear why the 
talks had been called.”278  
The lack of progress up to 1999 resulted in IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF) financial 
assistance to fund a permanent Secretariat, Daniel Mboya, and technical committees to 
address specific agenda items between the high-level talks; the mediation, however, 
required more than just additional participants to debate the issues.279 The appointment of 
Mboya, however, did little to affect the outcome of the first IGAD talks. The move was 
too little too late for the first phase of IGAD mediation. IGAD’s inability to influence the 
parties was recognized throughout the international community by 1999. Mboya’s 
assignment demonstrated that the IGAD was suffering from a lack of confidence and it 
would therefore require additional support.  
Mediator deficiencies added to the failure of outcomes during IGAD I but were 
not the primary reason for the failed peace process. As Lederach noted, ripeness can be 
cultivated during the mediation process. A mediator with power and prestige is more 
likely to be able to influence the parties through the use of positive and negative 
incentives. Mediator bias can also influence ripeness and mediation outcomes if 
belligerent perceptions of the bias appear to favor the positions of the parties. While the 
time may not be initially ripe for mediation, it can sometimes be ripened by the 
capabilities and performance of the mediator. The limited leverage and legitimacy of the 
IGAD mediators did little to bridge the divide between the SPLM/A and the GoS. Herein, 
while the IGAD mediators were not primarily responsible for the failed mediation 
outcomes, their limited influence did not cultivate the ripeness (MEO) so that belligerents 
would choose resolution over violent conflict.  
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International involvement did not always improve mediators’ legitimacy. Bilateral 
attempts by the United States, Britain, South Africa, and Norway undermined the 
IGAD’s strength to act as the regional player in charge and responsible for mediation 
between the SPLM/A and GoS.280 El-Affendi wrote that 
international involvement has, from the beginning, had paradoxical 
dimensions: purporting to support IGAD but implying a lack of 
confidence in the regional body. The IPF’s increasingly intrusive role 
made the relationship adversarial at times ... regional leaders were unable 
to demonstrate capacity to do without outside help by producing results, 
while the external powers kept looking over IGAD’s shoulder and pushing 
for a more direct role, but without being able to achieve much.281 
Throughout the first phase of IGAD mediation, a lack of legitimacy and leverage 
plagued mediators. In an effort to secure their own security, the mediators established a 
bias that pushed the GoS away from the mediation. International actors served to both 
undermine and prop-up the mediators; the lack of continuity, however, weakened IGADs 
ability to act in the best interests of both parties. The partiality, lack of leverage, and 
legitimacy contributed to the failed outcomes of the first IGAD peace initiative. The 
conflict was not ripe for mediation from the start of the IGAD peace initiative and 
mediator intervention did little to cultivate the relationship between the parties or end the 
second Sudanese civil war.  
3. IGAD Strategy 
IGAD mediators employed facilitative and formulative strategies during IGAD I. 
The mediators were restricted to these strategies because they had no leverage to 
influence the SPLM/A or GoS. Scholars recognize the need for mediators to shift 
strategies as events dictate, offering options and incentives to parties that require 
encouragement during the mediation process. An inability to do so restricted the IGAD  
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mediator options. A mediator with power has more options to sway conflict belligerents. 
The IGAD mediators were not entirely ineffective but had difficulty maintaining the 
direction of the mediation process.    
The IGAD primarily used a facilitative approach throughout the first phase of 
IGAD meetings. Kenya provided “good offices” where the GoS and SPLM/A could 
address each other and present their points of view. Those issues had not changed since 
the Abuja conferences. The discussions did little more than present the already 
entrenched attitudes and positions of each side.  
A formulative approach led to the mediator’s introduction of the DoP. The results 
of this strategy shift had implications on the future of all mediation efforts between the 
GoS and SPLM/A. IGAD mediators recognized that they needed a framework and 
original solutions to make progress. The DoP was a new way that the SPLM/A and the 
GoS attacked the gap between their positions.282 Khalid argued that had the IGAD 
mediators not proposed the DoP, the “talks would have fizzled out like all other previous 
mediations.”283  El-Affendi maintained that IGAD had no control over the talks. He 
commented that “discussions would turn into shouting matches and the less than cordial 
atmosphere would turn into hostile encounters.”284 While the mediators proposed a 
genuine solution to the belligerents, they could not force the parties to agree. The lack of 
leverage hamper the mediators ability to coerce the parties when a solution was available 
that addressed the issues of both parties.  
Mediator strategy, until the end of the first IGAD, switched between facilitative 
and formulative. Throughout the sessions, the debates between self-determination, cease-
fire, religion, and the state were prominent; IGAD was unable to pressure either party to 
bridge differences. Mediators attempted to continue discussions between the groups and 
sometimes sought to force changes in documents’ wording, but mediators could do little 
to pull or push the GoS or SPLM/A toward an agreement. IGAD was only able to present 
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proposals and solutions and try to nudge parties toward compromise. A lack of resources 
constrained IGAD in influencing either the GoS or SPLM/A. Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. 
Khadiagala state that President Moi “injected new life into the IGAD initiative [in 1997], 
nudging Bashir to finally accept the DoP;” this would be short-lived, however, as the 
parties returned to their trenches argued previous positions.285 IGAD remained limited in 
its strength and, as Wondu and Lesch wrote, “when IGAD resumed its efforts in 1997, it 
relied on mediation, without undertaking the sustained efforts needed to achieve a 
resolution.”286 The IGAD mediators appeared inattentive and unresponsive in their 
strategy. They appeared to have little energy to engage the parties and sort out the 
continuous strife between the SPLM/A and GoS. 
The IPF responded to the IGAD mediation’s continuous failures by pressing 
Mboya and IGAD mediators for an agreement. Mboya implemented a new framework to 
specifically address and have the parties respond to the most contentious issues—
secularism and self-determination—and commit in writing their disagreements before 
moving to other items on the agenda. The sequencing approach failed like all earlier 
mediator attempts to bridge the gap. In October 2000, an IPF appraisal revealed a lack of 
confidence in the IGAD peace process. The report stated that,   
The secretariat often works in a cumbersome, time-consuming manner; the 
decision-making is time consuming, difficult, and inflexible; the 
secretariat’s efficiency is adversely affected by its reliance on consensus 
decisions of the envoys of the four mediator countries; the IGAD mediator 
countries have different relationships with the two Sudanese parties to the 
conflict; the mediators all have a vested but different interest in the 
Sudanese conflict and each wants a different result from the peace 
process; the Special Envoy seems to lack the necessary authority to 
effectively pursue his mandate. Important initiatives from the Special 
Envoy are over-ruled; during negotiations, the secretariat acts as a 
cautious or passive observer rather than as active mediators; and not 
challenging the positions of the parties.287 
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Merriam-Webster defined strategy as “a careful plan or method for achieving a 
particular goal usually over a long period of time; the skill of making or carrying out 
plans to achieve a goal.”288 The IGAD mediators were crippled in their strategy by 
internal and external constraints, and they required resources that they did not have. 
Strategy is employed by mediators to develop a mediation environment that is more 
conducive for each party to make concessions and discard previously held positions. 
Mediator strategy (regardless of the approach taken) is adjusted to specific situations. As 
noted in the literature review, no strategy has proven to be more effective in all 
conditions of mediation. Strategies had more likely outcomes under certain parameters of 
disputant relations or mediator status but the use of one approach does not guarantee 
specific mediation outcomes. Though mediation strategy was not the sole reason for the 
failure of the IGAD I peace initiative, it contributed to failed mediation outcomes. 
Mediator impotency and disorganization did not improve mediation ripeness and 
contributed to continued violence between the SPLM/A and GoS. While the IGAD I 
mediation rounds were overshadowed by the continued intransigence of the parties, 
mediator strategy was, writ large, ineffectual in cultivating a change in the belligerents 
positions or ending the violent conflict. 
4. Ripeness 
As with the Abuja mediation efforts, the IGAD mediation process began at an 
inopportune time. Conditions between the SPLM/A and GoS had changed little from the 
end of the Abuja process to the end of IGAD talks in 1994, and both parties were still 
committed to pursuing military victory. The SPLM/A remained internally fractured and 
the GoS was cohesive. An asymmetric power balance persisted between the belligerents. 
It was not until the GoS experienced military defeat, changing its perception about the 
utility of mediation that it agreed to the DoP. However, shortly thereafter, it returned to 
its position of superciliousness. As discussed earlier, Bashir was pressured by both 
internal and external pressures and military defeats to do something to appease the 
                                                 
288 Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “strategy,” accessed 15 August 2013, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/strategy.  
 76 
domestic and international audience. Agreement to the DoP relieved those pressures 
enabled him to focus on regaining the military initiative against the SPLM/A. 
Throughout the latter periods of the IGAD I mediations, changes in GoS internal 
dynamics changed the perception of the costs of negotiation and in turn resulted in 
position shifts and swings regarding the willingness to compromise. When the GoS was 
internally cohesive, it redoubled its efforts at the mediation table to push its priorities of 
Sharia and a unified state. The SPLM/A remained continually stalwart in its position and 
became more obstinate when it achieved military parity and cooperation with other rebel 
groups. The relationship between the GoS and international actors drove the Khartoum 
regime to mediate, but there was not enough pressure from the mediators or the 
international actors to force concessions. A ripe moment existed to sign the DoP but did 
not last long enough to end hostilities.  
The GoS saw an opportunity to gain favor with the international community when 
it agreed to the DoP, but it did not view the mediation process as relief from stalemate, 
future military defeat, or an opportunity to gain an advantage in achieving its end state of 
an Islamic state. There had been a rupture between the party leadership but there were 
also a number of agreements with rebel groups that favored the negotiating position of 
the GoS. Increased efforts by the international community first threatened the Khartoum 
regime but improved relations with Sudan’s neighbors later removed the threat. A 
moment of ripeness passed quickly following SPLM/A and GoS signature of the DoP. 
The mediators attempted to capitalize on the progress but with their legitimacy in 
question and ability to coerce the parties limited, they were unable to pressure further 
deals between the SPLM/A and GoS. A ripe moment would not be cultivated until the 
mediators were more powerful and the parties were ready to sincerely use the mediation 
process to come to a compromise.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Timing can be a critical component to mediation. A capable mediator can also be 
beneficial for bringing about agreements between two warring parties. Mediation 
professionals and academics also view party cohesion and symmetry between parties as 
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influential to mediation outcomes. The IGAD I peace talks lacked the necessary 
conditions for a favorable mediation outcome. Concluding that a ripe moment was lost 
because the mediators were not powerful enough to cultivate an attitude shift has merit 
but it is unlikely that the SPLM/A would have surrendered its military dominance when it 
believed it was close to defeating the GoS. Additionally, increased mediator power was 
unlikely to circumscribe the vision of the GoS because to do so would have been an 
admission it had lost control of the state and a blow to the power of the Khartoum regime.  
While the IGAD heads of state appeared to be a good option for mediation, 
regional complexities between the GoS, SPLM/A, and IGAD mediators undermined 
neutrality. Although mediators may have had a bias, actors must perceive that the 
prejudice of the mediators will not affect the mediation process. The IGAD mediators’ 
actions within and outside of the mediation environment destabilized the impartial 
position of the mediators.  
The timing of the mediation effort was unfavorable. Necessary characteristics for 
a successful mediation between two warring parties were not in existence. The conditions 
on the battlefield did not present a MHS and neither party witnessed a MEO. The 
mediation process was a failure because violence was not abated. The GoS and SPLM/A 
continued entertain violence as the primary option to reach their goals. The mediation 
outcome of the IGAD I mediation was influenced by both context and process. During 
the mediation, context remained the primary determinant of mediation outcomes. Process 
played role in presenting a solution to previously intractable positions, but the strategy 
employed by the mediators was incapable of overcoming contextual factors. Mediation 
outcomes are the result of context and process factors that have varying weight in 
influencing mediation outcomes. The nature of the parties plays a significant role and 
with an absence of readiness by either party to negotiate, IGAD I resulted in failure. 
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V. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY FOR 
DEVELOPMENT PEACE INITIATIVE 2002–2005 
The IGAD II mediations occurred at a time when the second Sudan civil war was 
ripe for mediation. During this round of talks, there were a number of context and process 
factors that contributed to ripeness and successful mediation outcomes. There were 
perceptional shifts within each party and a change in battlefield dynamics that resulted in 
a MHS between the SPLM/A and GoS. The stature and power of the mediator was 
bolstered with participation and support from the international community that allowed 
the mediator to overcome earlier mediation strategy restrictions, cultivate belligerent 
relations, and create favorable circumstances for mediation outcomes. Both parties 
overcame internal fractionalization and had consolidated issue positions. A new breath of 
life was given to IGAD with the assignment of a new chief mediator and support from the 
international community. Financial and technical assistance enabled mediator use of all 
mediator strategies. International and domestic pressures forced the SPLM/A and the 
GoS to take the IGAD II mediation process more seriously. Many of the factors that were 
absent in the previous mediation efforts were now present and affected the mediation 
outcomes of SPLM/A and GoS negotiations. A ripe moment was achieved primarily by a 
change in the belligerents’ perceptions, perceptual shifts that were caused by changes in 
external conditions. The arrival of a true mutually hurting stalemate helped make IGAD 
II a fully ripe environment for mediation. Mediator attributes and strategy remained 
relatively unchanged. The success of IGAD II resulted from a culmination of variables 
that presented an opportunity for both sides to achieve their objectives through peaceful 
settlement of the 20 year conflict.  
IGAD II occurred from May 2002 to January 2005. President Moi assigned 
General Lazaro Sumbeiywo as chief mediator and called for the consolidation of Sudan 
peace efforts.289 Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani and Salva Kiir Mayardit represented the 
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GoS and the SPLM/A, respectively.290 Phase one of the IGAD II peace initiatives took 
place in Karen and Machakos, Kenya, from May 2002 to 20 July 2002.291 The IPF, and 
the “Troika” of Norway, Britain, and the United States supported the IGAD mediation 
team.292  
The IGAD II talks began contentiously, but the parties reached a framework 
agreement following a shift in the agenda. The GoS agreed with the framework after 
moving unity to the top of the agenda and assigning self-determination a lower in 
priority; the SPLM/A approved the removal of the cease-fire.293 Progress halted there; 
the GoS was unwilling to agree to an interim period or a negotiated arrangement and the 
delegation walked out of the conference after a few disparaging comments for 
Sumbeiywo.294  
At the next round of talks in June at Machakos, Chief Mediator Sumbeiywo 
proposed a “one country, two systems model” that both sides rejected.295 The parties 
returned to voicing their unremitting positions. The GoS wanted “state and religion 
within a federal system and [the SPLM/A] focused on the exercise of self-determination 
through referendum.”296 The mediators first allowed the parties to voice their positions 
and engaged them throughout the mediation effort to find a solution that would work for 
both. Nicholas “Fink” Henson conducted workshops and informal meetings with both 
sides to identify “red line” issues, negotiation sequencing, and areas of compromise that a 
piecemeal approval process could address.297 The SPLM/A felt slighted and became 
increasingly impatient that the mediators supported the GoS position of a federal state 
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with Sharia, but ignored their demands for a self-determination option.298 Sumbeiywo 
recognized that issues of the state, religion and self-determination were at an impasse and 
therefore the mediators could not decide linearly, so he employed a more comprehensive 
approach.299  
Sumbeiywo and Haysom crafted a compromise that addressed the main issues of 
both sides. The text stipulated a federal system of government with Sharia applicable 
only in the North and an option of self-determination through referendum following a 
six-year interim period.300 Sumbeiywo sequestered the delegation representatives in a 
conference room and informed them they could not leave until they agreed to the text. 
The representatives emerged with a consensus after four hours of analysis, mandate 
review, phone calls to their superiors, and minor modifications to the document. The GoS 
was satisfied with language that outlined a federal system of government and Sharia for 
the North and the SPLM/A was guaranteed “creation of a Southern region strong enough 
to help guarantee an opt-out through a referendum.”301 SPLM/A and GoS signed the 
Machakos Protocol on 20 July 2002. With “creative ambiguity,” the mediators presented 
a solution that “was designed to both ease the concerns of President Bashir and mesh 
with Garang’s vision of New Sudan.”302  
Garang and Bashir met for the first time following signature of the Machakos 
Protocol and both committed to continuing the peace process. The second phase of IGAD 
II talks transpired from August 2002 to January 2005. The two sides returned to address 
power and wealth sharing, constitutional issues, and the Three Areas (Abyei, Nuba 
Mountains and Southern Blue Nile), but a 1 September SPLM/A attack on Torit disrupted 
the mediation.303 Both sides sustained heavy losses attempting to gain the military 
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advantage. Johnson noted that the SPLM/A “was sending a message that they had the 
power to back their demands.”304 Garang remained suspicious of Khartoum’s intentions 
and believed that he needed to show SPLM/A’s military strength.305 Bashir refused to 
continue mediation until both parties agreed to a cease-fire and maintained that the 
mediators’ consideration of the Three Areas “[was] giving into the demands of the 
SPLM/A too easily ... a clear departure from the agenda agreed”; he also “accused the 
IGAD secretariat of accepting SPLM/A’s demand with a view to pleasing them at the 
expense of the rules.”306 The fighting ended in mid-October with the Memorandum of 
Understanding for the Cessation of Hostilities. The IGAD mediations renewed the 
agreement until the parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Talks occurred 
again in November 2002, but mediators achieved little.  
Throughout the spring of 2003 a number of meetings occurred. Violence in the 
Western Upper Nile between government-sponsored forces and minor SPLM/A factions 
almost derailed the first meeting in January 2003.307 Forced to deal with the violence, 
mediators were unable to keep the parties focused on the previously agreed upon agenda. 
While the mediation resulted in an expanded role of Verification and Monitoring Teams 
(VMT), mediators made no other progress.308  
On 2 April 2003 Garang and Bashir had a positive meeting in which they agreed 
to a timetable for negotiations. This was followed by another round of talks between the 
delegations from 6-16 April. Johnson noted that, “considerable progress was made on 
wealth sharing ... with assistance from the IMF, World Bank, the Troika and others; a 
technical, factual and educational approach really helped narrow the gap between the 
parties ... but key issues still remained on the table, unresolved.”309 Following the 
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meetings Garang and Taha expressed different concerns about the mediation process. 
While Taha confirmed that the government was serious, he did not want “arrangements 
of the interim period” to “prejudge the outcome of the referendum”, and Garang 
“expressed dissatisfaction with the IGAD team’s management of these particular 
negotiations” and warned against the inclusion of other militias in the talks.310 The 
delegations continued to negotiate with Taha and Garang monitor their parties’ actions.  
Another round of talks resumed in May 2003, during which the mediators 
attempted a comprehensive approach. Instead of the previous piecemeal strategy, 
mediators probed parties for their positions on the issues in order to analyze similarities 
and suggest trade-offs.311 The SPLM/A maintained that they were not able to deviate 
from the mandate or accept trade-offs. The GoS delegation accused the SPLM/A of 
purposely avoiding decisions that would move the talks forward. These sessions ended 21 
May with no decision on “security, the Three Areas, the presidency, political 
representation, or the status of the capital.”312 
The sixth round of talks began on 6 July in Nakuru, Kenya. The mediators 
presented a draft document, which established a program to discuss previously 
unresolved and contentious issues. The mediators saw the document as part of a “make-
or-break” strategy to “regain the momentum of the first Machakos round.”313 The GoS 
rejected the Nakuru Framework. They resented the framework’s support of southern 
autonomy and failure to adhere within the bounds of the Machakos Protocol.314 They 
further objected to advisors’ heavy handed involvement and proposed in an AU that 
South Africa should take over mediation the following July. The SPLM/A endorsed the 
framework but maintained reservations on security arrangements and oil revenue 
sharing.315 Discontented with the draft proposal and the mediator’s attempt to address all 
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issues at once instead of using an incremental approach to issue resolution resulted in 
GoS departure from the mediations.316 Instead negotiating a complete document that 
addressed national identity, power sharing, wealth sharing, etc, the government desired a 
single issue approach. The GoS demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the “totality 
approach” and rejected the aggressive moves of the mediators by walking away from the 
table.317 
The next summit took place September 2003 in Naivasha, Kenya. This was the 
beginning of bilateral talks between Garang and Taha and excluded the majority of 
observers, advisors, and press from previous sessions. During Garang-Taha negotiation 
Sumbeiywo managed external involvement and ensured the talks remained low profile. 
Only IGAD personnel were present with the media, observers and the Troika excluded 
from discussions.318 Garang, Taha, and their respective delegations discussed and 
debated at length the issue of security and power sharing. Proposals outlined the size, 
integration, and deployment of SAF and SPLM/A forces during the interim period. 
Garang was concerned that disbanding too many SPLM/A forces would give the 
government a tactical advantage if war returned; Taha was adamant that SAF remain 
north of the 13th parallel and wanted an extended redeployment period.319 Taha and 
Garang signed the Protocol on Security Arrangements on 25 September 2003. Garang 
made concessions on the size of the SPLM/A forces and Taha adjusted the SAF’s 
deployment areas. Although Taha and Garang forged the agreement the mediators’ 
pressure and assistance played a part in continuing talks when each side was 
uncompromising and prepared to give up.320  
Garang and Taha took full ownership of the mediation process with the successful 
negotiation of security arrangements. Over the next year and a half, negotiations between 
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Garang and Taha resulted in compromises from each side on wealth sharing, the Three 
areas, political participation, location of the capital, power sharing, and a permanent 
cease-fire arrangement.321 Mediators facilitated the Garang and Taha talks from 
September 2003 to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 
2005. When Garang and Taha needed cajoling or coercing to end deadlock, mediators 
extended their technical expertise or injected themselves into the process, but their 
participation was limited.322 Taha and Garang effectively brokered an agreement 
between themselves. While Taha contacted Bashir to get the president’s approval on 
accords between the parties, Garang negotiated without having extensive discussions 
with other leaders in the SPLM/A.323 The CPA brought the second civil war to an end 
and the IGAD peace initiative successfully ended a conflict that had raged for more than 
20 years.  
A. IGAD II ANALSIS 
Changes in the political, military, socio-economic, and diplomatic environment 
affected the mediation outcomes of IGAD II. The conditions for mediation between the 
GoS and SPLM/A were ripe for resolution and resulted in successful mediation 
outcomes. Circumstance within and between the parties convinced Garang and Bashir to 
take the peace process more seriously. The SPLM/A had an equal but tenuous military 
position on the battlefield. Islamization purist ideals no longer drove the NCP, which 
faced internal strife due to deteriorating economic conditions. Greater international 
community support empowered the mediators. Mediation is not a single process but a 
combination of complex activities that may be present from within or without. When the 
parties were prepared to negotiate the mediation process resulted in successful mediation 
outcomes. There was greater mediator legitimacy and outright bias against the GoS from 
the mediators but these characteristics did not have an overwhelming influence on the 
parties. Leverage that affected the mediation came from outside the mediation forum.  
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1. Nature of the Parties 
Those who controlled the government dominated the resources. Every regime 
throughout Sudanese history sought to benefit from its power position that allowed 
control of state resources. Bashir and the NCP aimed to remain in control. Loss of 
resources undermined their control of the state. The NCP relinquished stringent 
Islamization in favor of maintaining power and access to wealth.  
Turabi’s presence in the NIF had hampered earlier peace prospects. Turabi’s 
removal gave Bashir room to maneuver and lessened the importance of the ideological 
focus within this round of peace talks. Johnson noted that, “with Turabi cut loose and 
with a more coherent NCP, it was possible [for the GoS] to take a united position on 
negotiations ... those negotiations would moreover allow the NCP to secure the system, 
ensure stability and remain in power, an important motivation for the talks.”324 Bashir 
was in a position to control Sudan and was less concerned about domestic enemies. His 
power was not absolute, but he had removed a key rival. To shore up his loyal 
constituency, Bashir further built a client base that supported him. Sudan had always 
been a patrimonial state and access to resources enabled elites to build patronage 
networks. Bashir expanded his client base and consolidated economic and political 
control of the state with oil wealth.”325 Increased foreign investment and a rise in the 
middle class that would reap benefits from peace further pressured the NCP to negotiate 
peace.   
Young found that, “President Bashir was clear that the government ‘was 
compelled to fight but did not want to fight’” and that “a “strategic decision” had been 
made to embrace peace.”326 GoS weapons purchases put them in a better military 
position; they controlled the oil fields and the Islamic strategy was no longer a priority 
effort to maintain power.327 As noted earlier, the government maintained the central 
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theme of Islam, but it would sidestep Islam for a more practical approach to preserving 
power. Collins wrote that, “ideologically, Bashir and the military had been less 
committed to the Islamist ideal.”328 He further noted that, “pragmatic businessmen kept 
their distance from the Islamist movement, which some members regarded as a 
theologically inspired charade and which some members of the NCP believed no longer 
possessed sufficient momentum to achieve its goals.”329  Collins noted the following: 
The 9/11 hijackings may have transformed US foreign policy, but they 
also had a major impact on Khartoum... . Sudan hoped to normalize 
relations with the United States by offering cooperation against 
international terrorism and peace in the South. Despite the doubling of the 
military budget for military weaponry, the SPAF and PDF had yet to claim 
a significant military victory over the SPLM/A. Diversion of oil revenues 
into military expenditure ... food prices were high and discontentment was 
running deep ... unemployment among university graduates that had 
completed military service was nearly 70 percent, small business firms 
were unable to secure loans ... many members of the NCP now began to 
accept peace as the best possible solution to resolve or at least ameliorate 
Sudan’s socio-economic problems.330 
Sudanese society was war-weary and the Khartoum regime saw the unrest from decades 
of war. The Darfur conflict added a new front of fighting for an already beleaguered 
military. One might suggest that NCP had to settle one of the conflicts to maintain 
legitimacy and remove the threat of rebellion.  
While Islam served as a guiding influence and may have dissipated among 
moderate NCP members, Taha maintained a strong vision for an Islamic Sudan.331 
Though solid in his beliefs, he was also a pragmatist and “could read the political and 
external landscape well, and he knew what was at stake.”332 Young noted that “Taha had 
reservations about the peace process and because of his seniority in the government many 
people many people involved in the negotiations concluded that he must be brought on 
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board to win support.”333 While Taha could make decisions on the government’s behalf, 
he still had to get the Bashir’s approval. Taha’s power within the NCP and Muslim 
community gave him influence with Bashir. 
The change in the nature of the NCP affected the IGAD II’s mediation outcomes. 
A rigid ideology and leader no longer pushed the process. Mediators were aware that 
internal pressure might destroy the NCP if it failed satisfy a peace deal on at least one 
front. But the NCP also recognized pressures from outside its borders. Young noted that, 
“should the [peace] process break down completely, the US could again become a major 
threat to the survival of the [NCP] government.” The GoS, however, also believed that, 
“[the United States] was the only country that could bring the needed pressure to bear on 
Garang to sign an agreement.”334 The SPLM/A viewed United States involvement as a 
necessary influence on the GoS and to provide guarantees for mediation settlements and 
financial assistance to the Southern region.335 A ripened condition was created within the 
NCP with supporting perceptions, one negative, and one positive, of United States 
connection to the IGAD II peace initiative. The impact of the United States on the 
mediation effort and the positive or negative benefits of satisfying the desires of the 
United States helped to rearrange party perceptions that favored a peaceful solution. One 
must accept the IPF’s role and their influence on mediation process to understand IGAD 
II. The involvement of the United States changed the dynamic of the mediation process 
by influencing the parties. While not directly connected to the GoS and SPLM/A talks, its 
constant presence was a motivating factor for each party and facilitated the perception of 
a MEO. IGAD II offered an opportunity that was not available earlier.  
By the beginning of the 2002 IGAD peace talks, the SPLM/A’s mediation had 
position improved. The SPLM/A recovered from internal splits that broke the movement 
in 1991. The Dinka and Nuer internecine fighting decreased when Garang and Machar 
signed The Nairobi Declaration on Unity. This agreement was critical to furnishing the 
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SPLM/A with access to oil producing areas and Garang saw it as “a strengthening call for 
Southern self-determination.”336 Collins noted the following: 
By 2002 the SPLM/A had evolved into an effective fighting force that 
consistently inflicted severe defeats on the SPAF and PDF. [Garang] also 
understood that oil revenues would not immediately turn the tide of war in 
favor of the North, but in the long run they would make the SPLM/A 
vulnerable and revive the discarded notion that a military solution could 
be achieved. Finally, he was acutely aware that his people were weary of 
war; the southern Sudanese longed for peace. If he could deliver an 
acceptable solution it would guarantee his authority in the South.337 
Garang recognized that temporary military success could turn against the 
SPLM/A as it had in the early 1990s, and therefore made a strategic calculation that the 
time was ripe to engage more genuinely in negotiations.338 Garang’s perception was that 
this was the right time to engage in negotiations: if the SPLM/A was on a more equal 
footing with the GoS in the mediation effort, it would then be able to obtain more 
concessions to its position from the process. Delaying genuine mediation risked losing 
this position of strength. Additionally while Garang remained the dominant personality 
within the SPLM/A, his position was not unchallenged. Others within the SPLM/A 
increasingly questioned Garang’s position, arguing he had “created artificial unity based 
on forced acceptance of his rule.”339 But in 2002 the SPLM/A elites were cohesive and 
society’s peaceful desires pressed those in power to end the conflict, making this a ripe 
moment for negotiation. The IGAD II mediation outcome reflected both the Southern 
Sudanese compulsion to bring about peace and Garang’s knowledge that power parity 
would not remain and his position as leader of the SPLM/A was increasingly being 
questioned.  
The nature of the parties had therefore changed in ways that made the situation 
much riper for resolution than in previous eras. The NCP no longer focused on an 
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ideological program of Islamization and it weathered the GoS’s leadership breakup. NCP 
moderate’s fear that if the NCP continued to promote an unyielding message of Sharia 
throughout the country, then it would lose access to precious resources and wealth. The 
SPLM/A was now  cohesive organization; throughout the years preceding IGAD II it 
made agreements to shore up international and political support and, in 2002, it was also 
militarily equal  to the GoS on the battlefield. For the first time, the belligerents had 
power parity and the SPLM/A and GoS were also internally unified in their aspirations. 
Elites in both groups wanted to end the war, fearing that it continuance would cost them 
their positions. These changes would prove critical in altering mediation dynamics. One 
side was no longer dominant; war weariness pressured elites to make compromises and 
both sides recognized that if a negotiated settlement was not agreed upon then, the 
opportunity to do so would be lost. The leaders who could bring about peace took control 
of the process and found solutions where compromise was untenable before. Mediation 
ripeness was created by a change in the nature of the parties. This was a significant shift 
from previous mediation efforts and altered IGAD II mediation outcomes.  
2. Nature of the Mediators 
Legitimacy, leverage, and the perception of bias influence mediator capacity for 
impacting mediation outcomes. The literature, however, debates whether IGAD 
mediators had these characteristics. Parties’ attitudes toward the mediators shifted 
throughout the IGAD II peace talks. A host of states and international organizations 
backed the IGAD II Chief Mediator, but he had questionable leverage throughout the 
process. The mediation team maintained a modicum level of bias and specifically 
addressed both sides’ concerns during mediation; however, external pressures from the 
IPF sought an outcome in favor of the SPLM/A. As noted earlier the SPLM/A and GoS 
faced pressure to conclude a peace deal, but the mediators also felt pressure from 
observers to bring an end to the civil war.340  
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The international community came together to support the IGAD II peace talks 
and other initiatives had been pushed aside. Herein the IGAD forum was a legitimate 
entity to conduct mediations. The GoS found no other willing mediators so the only 
option it had was to return to the IGAD process. The SPLM/A recognized IGAD as the 
most practical forum to address their desires and believed the mediators were favorable to 
their cause.341 The GoS held negative views of members of the mediation team, but as it 
had no other options, it was forced to deal with those individuals. Young mentioned that 
Susan Page and “Fink” Haysom “were resented by GoS negotiators” and Waihenya wrote 
that the GoS “did not trust General Sumbeiywo.342 Young concluded that  
while the Special Envoy gained legitimacy among the parties because of 
his unstinting efforts to contain the observers and protect the negotiators 
from them, he and the parties operated in an international context over 
which they had little control and were constantly subject to the pressures 
that emanated outside the formal structure of the peace process.343 
Because the IGAD II mediation team was accepted (even though disliked) it 
maintained legitimacy as a third party intermediary. Their leverage, however, was 
questionable. Young claimed that “although IGAD received the mandate for conducting 
the mediation, provided the mechanism for the mediation, gave it legitimacy, and 
received funding, it had the least influence” in comparison to observers, advisors, and the 
troika.344 Within the confines of the Machakos Protocol, Sumbieywo demanded a 
solution from the parties; what remains unknown, however, is whether his direction or 
simply the parties’ recognition that they needed to resolve their differences was the 
impetus for the Machakos Protocol. Johnson noted that “the new chief mediator was  
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supported by a better secretariat with more international and technical experts, funded by 
the Troika and other countries,” however, Sumbieywo’s application of any sticks or 
carrots to leverage the parties was absent.345  
Throughout the SPLM/A and GoS mediations, the GoS perceived bias from the 
mediators and supporting countries. The GoS was put in a difficult position as Bashir 
noted with the “changing of the rules” and observer and advisor favoritism for the 
SPLM/A. Despite the perception of bias, however, the NCP felt that it had to negotiate or 
face US retribution.  Thus, despite mediator bias, the GoS still engaged in the mediation 
effort as it sought to avoid greater sanctioning by the United States. The IPF and the 
mediators appeared to generally support the SPLM/A, but in previous bouts of mediation, 
particularly in the Abuja talks, the mediators had been though to favor the GoS position.  
Assessing the nature of the mediator in IGAD presents a number of difficulties. 
There was a clear perception of bias that traditionally tends to dissuade one party from 
participation, but the GoS recognized the bias as a condition that they had to deal with; 
they essentially had no other option. Furthermore, though the mediators were legitimate, 
the “leverage” of the IGAD mediators was not actually in their control. The power of the 
mediators was considerably less than that of observers who might have taken action 
against the GoS or SPLM/A if no forward progress was achieved. Finally, the lack of 
mediator participation in later stages discredits the influence of the mediators. Many of 
the agreements between Garang and Taha were made absent participation of IGAD 
mediators.  
Overall it can be concluded that though the nature of the mediator minimally 
changed, those changes did not significantly affect mediation ripeness or mediation 
outcomes. The belligerents were less influenced by the legitimacy, leverage, and bias of 
the mediators than by other conditions surrounding the mediation environment. IGAD II 
ripeness was contingent on factors other than the nature of the mediator.  
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3. Mediator Strategy 
Mediator strategies during IGAD II mirrored the approaches used in the Abuja 
and IGAD I mediations, but in IGAD II, the character of the mediation was more 
organized. Throughout the peace process mediators had provided “good offices” where 
the parties negotiated, but aside from the introduction of the DoP, rarely adopted a 
directive or manipulative tactics. Unlike earlier IGAD peace talks, those who served 
under Sumbieywo were more organized. Johnson noted that, “Rather than sporadic 
negotiating sessions, convened for shorter periods of time, the IGAD secretariat now 
outlined a strict agenda for continuous talks and specific deadlines.”346 Initially a 
facilitative approach allowed the parties to voice their positions. With little forward 
movement, the mediators moved to a formulative strategy. Mediators used the 
Negotiating Framework Document as a comprehensive approach to reach a single 
settlement. Thereafter the parties rebuffed wide-ranging solutions that the mediators 
proposed. Young maintained that following parties’ rejection of the Nakuru Framework, 
“the mediators backed down and did not again to attempt to put before the parties a 
holistic approach to resolving the outstanding problems. Instead they shifted gears and 
followed a piecemeal approach.”347  
During the Garang-Taha discussions, however, the mediators served as 
facilitators. Johnson claimed that, “the role of the Chief Mediator and IGAD secretariat 
had thus diminished ... arranging technical meetings and the briefings of international 
experts.”348 Young remarked that “the role of Special Envoy Sumbeiywo and the 
mediation team declined [during the Garang–Taha talks], indeed they largely lost control 
of the process and were reduced to a formal presence and repeatedly going to Garang and 
Taha for updates.”349 A number of advisors participated and persuaded Garang and Taha 
to accept trade-offs and concessions. Young noted that   
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The resilience of Sumbeiywo in the peace process does not lie in his 
vision because there is no indication that he had one. Rather it lies in the 
fact that he successfully adapted to the interests of the strong-willed 
negotiators of the SPLM/A and the GoS, who did not want vision, 
aggressive leadership, intellectual grandstanding, or the production of 
grandiose proposals. Instead they wanted—and got—a go-slow piecemeal 
unimaginative process and the environment to carry out their endeavors 
largely free from the overt pressures of outside interests.350  
The mediators adopted their tactics to the needs of the belligerents. When the 
mediators attempted to intervene more forcefully they were rebuffed by the SPLM/A and 
the GoS. This shows that mediator strategy had little influence on the process (the 
practical removal of their participation further supports this point). The mediation forum 
provided an environment for the belligerents to discuss issues and come to concessions 
but mediator actions and strategy appear relatively inconsequential. If the can be credited 
with cultivating ripeness, it is because they enabled circumstances where Garang and 
Taha were free from external distractions and able to communicate face-to-face. If this is 
the case mediator strategy had little impact on the mediation outcomes.  
4. Ripeness 
During the IGAD II mediation effort, several factors shifted the perception of the 
SPLM/A and GoS, so that they finally believed that mediation was the best course of 
action. First, the parties were at a military stalemate. Victories and defeats had shifted 
between the SPLM/A and the GoS but neither group had achieved the overwhelming 
success necessary to shift the balance of power in its favor.  Zartman noted that a leveling 
of power between disputants and perceptions of stalemate are likely to lead belligerents 
to view mediation as a preferred option. A leveling and negative perception of continued 
violence brought forward a MHS at the beginning of IGAD II. 
Further ripening the prospects for settlement, both sides perceived an enticing 
opportunity (the mutually enticing opportunity, MEO that Zartman discussed). Ending 
conflict could potentially increase Bashir’s power by giving him additional resources to 
increase his client base. Furthermore, the increasing violence in Darfur meant required 
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Bashir to capitulate on one front to make gains on the other. The SPLM/A presented a 
larger threat to Bashir’s power so he was willing to make compromises with the SPLM/A 
and continue the conflict in Darfur. The opportunity for Bashir was the end to one 
conflict that threatened his control of the state. On the other side, Garang saw peace as 
the opportunity to solidify his position leader of the south by bringing peace to a region 
was involved in conflict for more than 20 years.  
Ripeness was not cultivated by the mediators per se, but by external pressures on 
the SPLM/A and GoS to end the war.  Positive and negative incentives pushed the GoS 
and SPLM/A to compromise. The SPLM/A was given guarantees for assistance; the GoS 
recognized continued bellicosity could result in international military action against the 
NCP regime. Ripeness, if it was influenced by the mediator strategy was limited in 
duration (Machakos Protocol negotiations) but was later based on the mediators adjusting 
their approach to what the SPLM/A and GoS wanted, not by forcing their own agenda.  
When a more forceful approach was needed, General Sumbeiywo pressed the parties to 
negotiate and agree to a document that was accepted by both delegations, but his force 
during this time is questionable. His ability to do so was backed by leverage provided by 
the IPF (specifically the United States). When the situation called for direct talks between 
Taha and Garang, Sumbeiywo withdrew and restrained international pressures that might 
disrupt the process. The mediators were important for the majority of IGAD II mediation 
as a buffer but not as actual participant between the belligerents. The third party, as a new 
influencing agent in the negotiations, was removed by the primary belligerents in the 
conflict.  
Mediation was successful between the SPLM/A and GoS when the parties saw 
mediation as an opportunity they could both benefit from and violent between them 
reached a plateau—neither party was gaining or losing ground.  Variables do not hold 
equal weight and during mediation periods, one factor may weigh more heavily on the 
influence of mediation outcomes than other factors. Overall, IGAD II produced 
successful mediation outcomes because the relationship between the parties had become 
ripe for mediation.  
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B. CONCLUSION 
The IGAD II peace process between the SPLM/A and the GoS was successful in 
reaching agreements; a number of conditions outside the mediation environment and 
within the parties influenced the belligerents to seriously negotiate for peace. NCP 
solidarity preceded the IGAD II mediation rounds and reduced emphasis on an unbending 
ideological focus. The SPLM/A gained internal cohesiveness through mended 
relationships that had previously pitted one rebel group against the other. Power parity 
was reached between the parties and they perceived a MHS. External actors played a role 
in the mediations. While they did not directly impact the mediations, they affected what 
would transpire if mediation efforts had failed; thus, external actors’ involvement 
appeared to motivate both parties to reach a settlement. The mediators contributed to the 
agreements first by detailing the issues and second by providing a solution that would 
facilitate dialogue between the SPLM/A and GoS in the early stages of IGAD II. When 
Taha and Garang took the lead, the mediators were relegated to a minor role. The strategy 
that the mediators’ employed was a response to what the parties desired. In effect, 
belligerent desires restricted mediators’ actions and mediators could do little outside the 
bounds that the parties identified. Mediation outcomes of IGAD were primarily the result 
of changes in the nature of the parties. Ripeness was achieved because the parties 
recognized that violence was no longer in their best interests.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Mediation is a third-party attempt to end a dispute between rivals who have 
seemingly intractable differences. Mediation attempts to inject an external stimulus to 
change conflict structures and alter negotiation conditions in order to end violence. 
Mediation outcomes are contingent on conflict conditions, belligerents’ nature, mediator 
attributes, mediation strategy, and ripe moments for intervention. A mixture of these 
factors affects the success or failure of mediation.   
This thesis analyzed how and why context and process factors influenced 
mediation outcomes. Examining factors of context and process that mediation literature 
suggested was important to the success or failure of mediation, the thesis removed 
conflict issues as a specific mediation outcome variable, noting that, throughout the 
Abuja and IGAD mediations, parties’ issues remained relatively fixed. This thesis sought 
to determine the weight of party and mediator nature, mediation strategy, and ripeness on 
mediation outcomes; it used a combination of process tracing and the contingency model 
of mediation to guide an analysis of how process and context factors affected mediation 
outcome.  
The desire to understand and explain the mediation outcomes of three 
international efforts for mediating peace between the SPLM/A and the GoS prompted the 
thesis. Mediation literature provided a compilation of factors that have influenced 
mediation success or failure.  
The Abuja peace process did not have the necessary conditions for successful 
mediation. The GoS held a politically and militarily dominant position and the NIF’s 
consolidated positions meant that mediation had to produce an agreement equivalent to 
an outright GoS victory. Elites directed a zero-compromise stance and limited delegation 
concession making authority. The SPLM/A was unlikely to make concessions to GoS 
demands because it had a fragmented composition and deteriorated battlefield position. A 
military defeat would be tantamount to a settlement for the SPLM/A, which would have 
relegated them to a marginalized, subordinate position within the state. Mediators were 
powerless, and their strategy was ineffectual in producing a settlement between the 
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parties. They lacked the leverage and neutrality to affect the outcome. Abuja was a failure 
because it produced no significant settlements or agreements between the parties and did 
not end the violent conflict in Sudan. The mediation outcome of the Abuja peace 
initiatives resulted from context factors and process did not especially influence it; 
SPLM/A and GoS internal dynamics and the asymmetric relationship prohibited a peace 
settlement. The conflict was not ripe for mediation.  
IGAD I mediations occurred during two periods of vastly different circumstances. 
The first period reflected Abuja mediation conditions. The nature of the parties, 
mediators, and strategy could not bridge the disparity between the GoS and SPLM/A. 
Party dynamics established conditions prime for failure. The mediators, though backed 
by a mandate and the prestige of multiple heads of state, were feeble in directing the 
mediation efforts. The mediators were formulative in presenting the DoP but lacked the 
leverage to coerce the GoS to accept the proposals. Mediator bias against the GoS further 
crippled mediator legitimacy. 
The second phase of the IGAD I saw a dramatic shift in the party make-up, where 
the positions of the parties was reversed. The SPLM/A increased its military power 
relative to the GoS, developed alliances with other political parties, and adopted a 
political-military strategy against the GoS. Conversely the GoS began to fracture within 
and suffered extensive defeats on the battlefield. The GoS agreed to the DoP to satisfy 
external pressures against the Khartoum regime but its intention to maintain the integrity 
of the agreement faltered following an upswing of armed force triumphs against the 
SPLM/A. Furthermore, NIF leadership fissures resulted in a party split and uncertain 
political associations. The mediators remained ineffectual in driving the belligerents 
toward a compromise. The SPLM/A did not make concessions because their perception 
of increasing strength vis-à-vis the GoS pointed to military victory as a possible 
consequence. The one success during the first IGAD mediations resulted from conditions 
outside the talks, and therefore, was unattributable to the mediators. Mediators attempted 
a forumlative strategy but the parties restricted them to a facilitative approach. Mediators 
during the 1997-2001 IGAD mediations remained powerless in altering conditions to 
affect mediation outcome. While the good offices and dialogue between the belligerents 
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provided a platform for parties to share their diametrical viewpoints on substantive 
issues, the belligerents proscribed a peace settlement. IGAD I was a failure because it 
was unsuccessful in ending violence between the SPLM/A and GoS.   
During IGAD II, the GoS and SPLM/A held a power equilibrium and relatively 
symmetrical military strength. Garang recognized the potential for the SPLM/A to lose 
tactical strength and mediations presented the best opportunity to gain concessions from 
the GoS. Reconciliation of SPLM/A elites and consolidated objectives for Southern 
autonomy established a single negotiation stance. The NCP emerged as the principle 
political authority within the GoS; a united desire to maintain power bonded elites. Both 
the SPLM/A and GoS preserved internal cohesiveness. Mediator bias (specifically from 
the IPF) favored the goals of the SPLM/A and domestic conditions forced the GoS to 
capitulate to the SPLM/A’s demands. The mediators participated in the initial stages, but 
lost significance when the principals directly engaged with each other. Initially, 
mediators took a facilitative approach and followed it with a formulative strategy. 
External elements that were not directly involved the mediation created incentives for 
compromise. Manipulation did not occur within the mediation environment, but was a 
result of United States (and others) threats and guarantees to reach a peace deal. The 
IGAD II mediation outcome was based predominantly on party willingness to finally 
compromise and the key decision makers’ participation. The mediators played a role in 
providing a forum for the leaders (and delegations) to hold discussions and conducted 
shuttle diplomacy; they engaged parties when negotiations faltered, but their impact, 
through direct involvement or proposal of solutions, on the mediation outcomes was 
negligible. IGAD II was a success because it resulted in the Machakos Protocol and 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and ended the two-decade Sudanese civil war.  
Belligerents have often entered into mediation as a final option in an attempt to 
resolve their differences. Mediators have striven to facilitate an end to violent conflict by 
serving as intermediary between disputants. Meditation has been successful, however, 
only when both parties are prepared to end the violent conflict. Unless the conditions are 
ripe for resolution, mediators will have minimal impact on ceasing hostilities. This thesis 
analyzed three factors affecting mediation outcome and demonstrated that factors internal 
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to the conflicting parties, particular their perception of ripeness, as one of the most 
determinant factors in explaining the shift from the failed Abuja and IGAD I mediation 
efforts to the successful IGAD II mediation initiative.   
This thesis research began with the view that the literature often undervalues the 
impact of mediators. Regardless of the strategy employed, the role of the mediators was 
more significant because their participation changed the dynamic of the relationship 
between the parties. The conversations between the belligerents were no longer purely 
bilateral. The mediator became an active participant in influencing the mediation 
outcome. However, this thesis showed that mediators and mediator strategies are not 
determinant in explaining mediation outcomes. The nature of the mediator and mediation 
strategy during the second Sudanese civil war had little impact on mediation outcomes 
per se when the conditional circumstances were not ripe for mediation.  
Mediation analysis of the second Sudanese civil war demonstrated that context 
was more important than process in determining mediation outcomes. The mediation 
environment was vaguely swayed by the mediator’s nature or their strategy. Writ large, 
Abuja and IGAD I mediations were not initiated at ripe moments. The conflict became 
ripe for resolution when a number of different factors aligned to present an opportunity 
for the SPLM/A and NCP to benefit from peace talks. The change in the nature of the 
parties had the most significant effect. Power balance and change in the ideology of the 
NCP allowed Bashir to backtrack on previous demands that called for a single Islamic 
state with Sharia. The pressure of moderates within government and war weariness 
among the population permitted him to change GoS negotiation positions without a “loss 
of face.” Garang recognized his position was in peril and that the power parity between 
the SPLM/A and GoS could shift against the SPLM/A. During IGAD mediations, the 
SPLM/A was more cohesive than it had been since the start of the civil war. The fear that 
the SPLM/A would fracture again and potential of future military defeat provided Garang 
with encouragement to negotiate an end to the conflict.  
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A. THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
Jeffrey Rubin noted that “for international mediation to be effective, three things are 
required: disputant motivation to settle or resolve the conflict in question, mediator 
opportunity to get involved, and mediator skill.”351 In the Sudanese civil war mediation 
efforts, belligerents demonstrated little motivation to settle. Therefore, even with 
mediator opportunity and skill, the mediators had little influence on the outcome. This 
conclusion has confirmed the literature’s idea that the nature of the parties and ripe 
moments for mediation are perhaps the most important factors in determining mediation 
success or failure. Although mediation might be less expensive than war, it still requires 
significant investment from both parties and the mediator. Attempting mediation at the 
wrong time, when parties are unwilling and unenthusiastic toward mediation, would be a 
poor investment. However, the thesis also demonstrated that mediation efforts, and 
particularly third party actors, can help to shift the perception of the parties and thereby 
increase the ripeness for resolution. This is outside the realm of formal mediation, 
however.  In conditions where the parties are clearly unable to compromise and perceive 
that they can win their positions on the battlefield, mediation outcomes will ultimately 
fail.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
Future research could explore a number of areas to further understand which 
factors influence mediation outcomes. This thesis concluded that the nature of the parties 
and their readiness to negotiate mainly influenced mediation outcomes. A prospect for 
future research would be to further identify the political dynamics of warring parties as a 
measure to begin mediation. Power parity between parties has been a significant indicator 
for the potential mediation success, because it affects this willingness to negotiate. 
Practitioners could use in-depth analysis of party ideology, actor strength, power parity, 
and the internal cohesion of belligerents to determine whether mediation might be 
appropriate. The thesis further demonstrated the importance of elite and primary decision 
                                                 
351 Jeffery Z. Rubin, “International Mediation in Context,” in Mediation in International Relations, 
eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992): 251. 
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maker involvement in negotiations. Psychological profiling party elites could also 
provide mediators with information on belligerents’ willingness to negotiate. Those who 
control the parties make decisions for the parties’ future. Delegations have limited power 
to make decisions that significantly alter mediation outcome. The mandates of 
delegations allow them to compromise on certain issues and ignore others that might 
compromise the party’s position. Future mediation in international conflicts could benefit 
from a more inclusive leadership role and understanding of leaders’ prerogatives.  
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APPENDIX A. TIMELINE 
Date Event 
1820 Invasion of Sudan by forces of Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt. 
1820–
1881 
Turco-Egyptian Rule, also known as Turkiyya. 
1841 Opening up of the marshlands of the Sudd to large-scale 
incursions by merchants from the Nile Valley, Ottoman and 
Egyptian troops, and Europeans.  
1863–
1867 




Conquest of the sultanate of Darfur by the forces of Zubayr al-
Rahma. 
1881 Muhammad Ahmad announces that he is the “Mahadi” chosen to 
reform the land. 
1882–
1898 
Defeat of the Turkiyya and the establishment of a theocratic 
Mahdist state. 
1897 Italy retroceded Kassala to the Anglo-Egyptian government in 
December 1897 after its defeat at the hands of Menlik’s army in 
the Battle of Adowa in March 1896. 
1898–
1916 
Restoration of the sultanate of Darfur by Ali Dinar. 
1899–
1955 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and the reinstatement of the 
Second Turkiyya. 
1916 Anglo-Egyptian annexation of the sultanate of Darfur. 
1929 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the use of the Nile waters. 
1945 Founding of the Arab League. 
1947 Juba Independence Conference. 
1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement providing for Sudanese self-
government. 
1955 Torit mutiny and the onset of the first civil war. 
1956 Sudan’s accession to independence. 
1958 Military takeover of elected government. 
1965  Round table conference. 
1969 Military coup d’état brings Jaafar Numeiri to power. A military-
led coup led by Muannmar Qaddafi, disposes King Idris of Libya. 
1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. Sudan Socialist Union established. 
1979 Oil discovered in Upper Nile and southern Kordofan. 
1980 Southern Regional Assembly dissolved. Southern boundaries 
redrawn to enable government to transfer oilfields to the north. 
1983 Formation of the Southern Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A). 
1985 Jaafar Numeiri is deposed by military coup. 
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1986 Sadiq al-Mahdi elected as prime minister. Official support given to 
tribal militias, the murahaleen, who led the government’s 
campaigns against armed dissidents in the south, in Darfur, in the 
southern Blue Nile Hills, and in the Nuba mountains. 
1987 State of emergency declared and the systematic attacks waged on 
Nuba mountains. Escalation of Zaghawa-Fur clashes in Darfur.  
1989  Military coup d’etat brings Omar al-Bashir and the National 
Islamic Front (NIF) to power. 
1990 SPLM/A Agreement with the National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA). Chadian forces enter Darfur. 
1991 First NDA summit in Addis Ababa after the fall of the Mengistu 
regime. SPLM/A forced to leave their camps in. Split occurs in the 
SPLM/A leading to the Nasir faction. SPLA-Torit forces led by 
Daoud Bolad launch attacks inside Darfur. 
1992  Jihad declared against dissidents in Nuba Mountains and the south. 
Abuja negotiations by President of Nigeria between the SPLM/A 
and Government of Sudan (GoS). 
1993 President Bashir requests Inter-Governmental Authority for 
Development (IGAD) serve as mediators to the North-South 
conflict. SPLA-United formed by Lam Akol and other opponents 
of John Garang, Government offensives around Heglig oilfield. 
1994–
2000 
IGAD I mediation of North South conflict.  
1994 IGAD Peace Initiative talks begin. First national convention held 
in Chukudum attended by multi-ethnic representatives. Attacks by 
Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) on Sudanese refugees 
increase. Libya-Chad conflict ends. IGAD unveils the Declaration 
of Principles (DoP). SPLM/A signs the DoP as the basis for future 
peace talks with GoS. 
1995 Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) and Beja Congress admitted into the 
NDA at its Asmara meeting in 1995. Failed assassination attempt 
by Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak by agents supported by the 
GoS. 
1996 President Bashir elected as president of Sudan. Osama bin Laden 
leaves Sudan. Southern factions sign agreement with GoS. Sadiq 
al-Mahdi escapes from Sudan to Eritrea. 
1997 NDA captures Karora. SPLM/A forces in Nuba Mountains repulse 
government attacks.. GoS signs the DoP as basis for future talks.  
1998 Ali Osman Taha becomes first vice-president. GoS offers to hold 
referendum on future of southern Sudan. Increased clashes 
between Rezeigat and Masalit tribes in Darfur. Southern Sudanese 
factionalism rife, leading to many betrayed agreements. 
1999 President Bashir dismisses the National Assembly and southern 
state assemblies. National Congress (formerly NIF) emerges as the 
only legitimate political party. Fighting escalates in northern and 
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western Darfur. Wunlit peace agreement signed between the Dinka 
tribe of Bahr al-Ghazal and the Nuer of the western Upper Nile. 
NDA destroys oil pipelines. GoS begins to export oil. Hasan al-
Turabi proposes constitutional amendments to curtail President 
Bashir’s powers. Bashir strips Turabi of all his powers as Speaker 
of the House.  
2000 President Bashir reelected as president. Sudanese-Eritrean 
diplomatic relations resume. Increased rebel attacks on oil 
installations and infrastructure. The Black Book published 
outlining the discrimination and marginalization of peripheral 
communities and citizens not belonging to the three dominant 
riverine tribes. Split in the NIF. IGAD I Peace Initiative ends.  
2001 SPLM/A and PNC sign a memorandum of understanding that 
leads to Turabi arrest. Senator John Danforth appointed special 
envoy to Sudan. GoS begins cooperation with U.S. intelligence 
agencies. UN Security Council lifts diplomatic sanctions against 
Sudan. U.S. sanctions remain in place. IGAD II Peace Initiative 
begins. General assigned as  
2002 Nairobi Declaration signed between the Garang’s SPLM/A and 
Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Defence Force (SPDF). Abyei 
Declaration signed between Messirya and Ngok Dinka. Combined 
SPLM/A and SPDF attacks on oil infrastructure lead to the 
suspension of oil-drilling operations. Sudanese National Alliance 
and Sudan Alliance Forces merge. SPLM/A-Umma Party talks 
begin. Signing of the Machakos Protocol (June), GoS-SPLM/A 
agreement for the cessation of hostilities (October), and MOU 
(November). Government paramilitary raid at Shoba in Northern 
Darfur. 
2003 Darfur Liberation Front renamed to the Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army (SLM/A). Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) created from splinter SPM/A members. SLM/A-JEM 
combined attacks against the GoS lead to GoS-armed and paid 
Janjaweed militia attacks against villages throughout Darfur. 
SLM/A demands inclusion in the ongoing GoS-SPLM/A peace 
process but are rejected. Atrocities throughout the region are 
reported to the international community. 
2004 GoS launches systematic offensive in Darfur using Janjaweed and 
regular armed forces. SLM/A admitted into membership of the 
NDA leading GoS to suspend ties with NDA. Turabi arrested on 
charges of conspiring to launch coup. U.S. declares Darfur crisis 
to be genocide; UN Human Rights Commission rejects 
international criticism of GoS atrocities in Darfur. Discord and 
disunity between SLM/A and JEM; fighting breaks out between 
the two groups. 
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2005 Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the GoS 
and SPLM/A on 9 January. African Union (AU) observers arrive 
in Sudan. Formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU). 
John Garang dies in helicopter crash; Salva Kirr Mayardit replaces 
Garang. 
Note: Timeline events and text are cited primarily from Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. 
Khadiagala., Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006, 181–
185 with additional events added from IRIN, “In-depth: ‘Sudan: A future without War?’—
IRIN In-Depth on the Prospects of Peace in Sudan,” 
http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthId=22&ReportId=64280 and  BBC 
News Africa, “Sudan Timeline,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14095300. 
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APPENDIX B. KEY TEXT AND AGREEMENTS 
Date Text and Agreements Signatories 
February 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement GoS and SSLM/Anya Nya 
March 1986 Koka Dam Declaration SPLM/A and NANS 
November 1988 November Accords  SPLM/A and DUP 
January 1992 Frankfurt Declaration SPLM/A-Nasir and GoS 
April 1993 The Nairobi Communiqué National Democratic Alliance 
October 1993 The Washington Declaration SPLM/A and SPLM/A-United 
December 1994 Chukudum Agreement SPLM/A and Umma Party 
April 1995 Political Charter GoS and SPLM/A-United 
June 1995 Asmara Declaration NDA (DUP, Umma, 
SPLM/A, Trade Unions, Beja 
Congress, & Independents) 
1995–1996 Operation Lifeline Sudan 
Agreement on Ground rules 
SPLM/A and UNICEF (July 
1995), SSIM/S and UNICEF 
(August 1995), SPLM/A-
United and UNICEF (May 
1996) 
April 1996 Political Charter SPLM/A-Bahr el-Ghazal 
Group, SSIM/A and GoS 
July 1997 Declaration of Principles SPLM/A and GoS 
September 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement  GoS and SSDF, SPLM/A 
Bahr el-Ghazal, SSIG, EDF, 
USAP and Bor Group 
September 1997 Fashoda Peace Agreement GoS and SPLM-United 
March 1999 Wunlit Dinak-Nuer Covenant SPLM/A and SPLM/A-United 
January 2002 Nairobi Declaration on Unity SPLM/A and SPDF 
January 2002 Nuba Mountains Ceasefire 
Agreement 
GoS and SPLM/A Nuba 
July 2002 Machakos Protocol GoS and SPLM/A 
October 2002 Memorandum of Understanding 
on the Cessation of Hostilities 
GoS and SPLM/A 
November 2002 Agreement on the extension of 
the Memorandum of 
Understanding of 
Understanding on the Cessation 
of Hostilities 
GoS and SPLM/A 
November 2002 Memorandum of Understanding 
of Structures of Government 
GoS and SPLM/A 
February 2003 Memorandum of Understanding 
regarding Points of Agreement 
on Power Sharing and Wealth 
GoS and SPLM/A 
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Sharing 
February 2003 Addendum on the 
Memorandum of Understanding 
of Understanding on the 
Cessation of Hostilities 
GoS and SPLM/A 
May 2003 Cairo Declaration GoS and SPLM/A 
September 2003 Ceasefire Agreement GoS and SPLM/A 
 Framework Agreement on 
Security Arrangements during 
the Interim Period 
GoS and SPLM/A 
January 2004 Agreement on wealth sharing 
during the pre-interim and 
interim period 
GoS and SPLM/A 
May 2004 Protocol between the 
Government of Sudan and the 
SPLM/A on the Resolution of 
Conflict in Southern 
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and 
Blue Nile States 
GoS and SPLM/A 
May 2004 Protocol between the 
Government of Sudan and the 
SPLM/A on the Resolution of 
the Abyei Conflict 
GoS and SPLM/A 
May 2004 Protocol on Power Sharing GoS and SPLM/A 
June 2004 The Nairobi Declaration on the 
Final Phase of Peace in the 
Sudan 
GoS and SPLM/A 
November 2004 Declaration on the Conclusion 
of IGAD Negotiations on Peace 
in the Sudan 
GoS and SPLM/A 
December 2004 Agreement and implementation 
of the protocols and agreements 
GoS and SPLM/A 
December 2004 Agreement on Permanent 
Ceasefire and Security 
Arrangements Implementation 
Modalities during the Pre-
Interim and Interim Periods 
GoS and SPLM/A 
January 2005 The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement 
GoS and SPLM/A 
Note: Key text and agreements cited from “Key Texts and Agreements” in Accord Peace by Piece: 
Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts 18, (2006): 78.  
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